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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to explore the rise of Islamism and Islamic radicalism in the Republic of 
Maldives. It analyzes the causes and grievances which have fueled the rise of political 
Islam, as well as its radical elements, and the main groups operating in both the political 
and social space (as well as on the fringes), including an analysis of their main 
ideological drivers and their social and political outlook. 
The closed and conspiratorial nature of the Maldivian political environment, as 
well as the use of repression to quell political dissent and the manipulation of Islamic 
religious ideals to cement political position was one factor that led to the rise of Islamism 
and Islamic radicalism. Another was the rapid modernization that introduced alien 
concepts and values into Maldivian society. These militated against the traditional norms 
and cultures and wrought havoc on the social structures, causing intense alienation and 
social dislocation. All these changes were taking place in a context where Maldives was 
being infiltrated by radical elements, both local and foreign. They made ample use of the 
social conditions to craft and narrative that was conducive to their recruitment and 
radicalization efforts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis aims to explore the rise of Islamism and Islamic radicalism in the 
Republic of Maldives. It analyzes the causes and grievances which have fueled the rise of 
political Islam, as well as its radical elements, and the main groups operating in both the 
political and social space (as well as on the fringes), including an analysis of their main 
ideological drivers and their social and political outlook. 
This paper also analyzes the atmospheres and conditions that prevail in Maldives 
and those that provide recruitment opportunities for regional and global terrorist 
organizations. A significant part of the Islamic radical element in Maldives has been the 
recruitment of Maldivian youth to take part in jihadi operations in conflict areas in the 
region.  This thesis will delve deeper into the ties between socioeconomic and political 
conditions within Maldives and how they facilitate recruitment. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Maldives is a society that has been undergoing rapid transformation since the 
1970s. The advent of tourism in the 1970s was seen by many as the harbinger of 
economic prosperity and affluence to the small island nation. Advancements in health 
care led to population increases. Primary and secondary education was introduced and 
enrollment in the government education system was made mandatory. This resulted in an 
increase in the number of people graduating from school, who then flooded the job 
market or who pursued higher education abroad. 
Tourism, though mainly restricted to highly exclusive resorts, also brought in a 
culture of Westernization. This was accompanied by a massive wave of internal 
migration to the capital Male’ from the outlying island, as people moved in search of 
better education and employment opportunities. Male’, an island of only 2 square 
kilometers, was forced to accommodate almost 1/3 of the nation’s population. This 
created socioeconomic issues such as overcrowding, congestion, and increases in 
domestic crime rates, as well as widespread drug abuse. 
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Meanwhile, from the economic and political sides, the prospects looked bleak. 
Maldivian law, until 2005, did not allow for the operation of political parties. Lawful 
political dissension was dealt with harshly. Compounding the problem was the fact that 
religion was manipulated by the regime in order to ensure civil order and maintain 
internal security. The state pushed forward a “moderate and modern” interpretation of 
Islam, and held tight control over the Islamic ulema and clerics. The lines between 
religious opposition and political opposition were often blurred with the help of the 
government-controlled media, and the masses were kept under tight control. 
With the promulgation of political parties in 2005, Islamic political activism was 
introduced. Religious organizations focusing on social issues were also formed. All these 
developments were accompanied by growing Islamic conservatism and the adoption of 
Islamic practices and norms that stood in sharp contrast to the more liberal norms of the 
past. Islamic ulema and clerics, who had attended Islamic education facilities in places 
like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and returned back to the country, contributed greatly to 
this tide, as did the presence of several regional Islamic social organizations. The 
President of Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, in an interview given to CNN-IBN in 2009, 
expressed grave concerns about the presence of Islamic extremist and radical elements in 
Maldives. He also stressed the dangers of regional terrorist organizations, which had 
successfully conducted recruitment among the Maldivian youth, possibly numbering in 
the thousands. These youth, according to President Nasheed, attended madrassas 
dispensing radical education or participated in terrorist operations within Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.1  
While the numbers may be a slight exaggeration, the phenomenon is very real 
and poses serious security, as well as economic, threats to Maldives. Maldives has an 
economy which is almost exclusively dependent on tourism, and the presence of such 
radical elements, with their anti-western sentiments and proven latency to strike against 
Western targets, can greatly undermine the fragile economy of Maldives. In addition, 
Maldives is also gaining international infamy as a breeding ground for Islamic 
                                                 
1“Radicals in Pak recruiting our youth: Maldives,” Mohamed Nasheed (President of Maldives), in an 
interview given to CNN-IBN, October 25, 2009. 
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radicalism. Indian intelligence sources indicate that Maldives has become an 
administrative space for regional terrorist groups, especially groups based in and 
operating out of Pakistan. Such happenings can greatly tarnish the image of Maldives and 
strain its relationship with regional neighbors. 
Given such dangerous developments and the fragility of the situation, it is 
imperative that Maldivian authorities implement effective measures to stem the tide of 
radicalism, as well as to halt the recruitment of its youth. Ascertaining the nature of the 
threat and establishing a baseline is one of the first steps in such an endeavor. Key 
players, their motivations, their modus operandi, as well as their ideology, need to be 
identified and analyzed in-depth to frame effective counter strategies. Additionally, the 
conditions, processes, and specific issues that act as sources of radicalism need to be 
identified and addressed. Only then can the tide of radicalism be turned. 
In addition to the above issues, there has been less academic attention devoted to 
studying the phenomenon of Islamism and Islamic radicalism in niche Islamic 
communities like Maldives. Though the nature of Islamism differs from country to 
country, the present study of Islamism and Islamic radicalism in Maldives may help 
support the existing explanation for the rise of Islam in other Muslim communities across 
the world, or, at the very least, it can offer different explanations that may have relevance 
even outside of Maldives. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars writing about the phenomenon of political Islam (or Islamism) have 
defined it in various ways. According to Fuller, political Islam posits that “Islam as a 
body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be 
ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.”2 Barton 
suggests that the term covers a wide array of activities conducted by groups with different 
goals. Some groups may want Islam to be accorded a greater place and recognition within 
the political system and society, while the more radical groups may wish to transform the 
existing Islamic social and political structure to resemble a more theocratic 
                                                 
2 Graham Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), xi. 
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configuration.3 Roy suggests that political Islam starts with the view that “…Islam is a 
global and synthesizing system of thought.”4 According to Roy, the term “Islamism” 
suggests the differentiation that is made between being Muslim and being Islamic, 
because the Islamists’ focus is on establishing an Islamic foundation as well as structures. 
Along a similar line, Hafez suggests that the term “Islamist” can be used to refer to any 
“individual, group, organization and parties that see in Islam a guiding political doctrine 
that justifies and motivates collective action on behalf of that doctrine.”5 Islamists, 
therefore, are those who are actively engaged in social and political activism, for a 
multitude of reasons. By this logic, according to Piscatori, Islam is both a “righteous 
program of principle and activity” as well as the “raison d'être” of politics and hence, 
“must be politicized.”6 
As defined by many scholars, Islamism encompasses a wide array of actors and 
motives, ranging from the revolutionaries who view the project of “Islamicizing” society 
as a project best tackled through the state’s power apparatus, to the more reformist camp, 
who see social transformation at grass-root levels preceding the advent of an Islamic 
state.7 The spectrum of Islamic political activism has also been addressed in detail in a 
study conducted by RAND, in which Islamic movements were mapped out according to 
their approach and tendencies towards democracy, use of terrorism and violence, and 
ideology used to justify violence. Their study identified six broad categories of Islamic 
political activism in the Muslim world, ranging from radical fundamentalists, such as the 
Salafist organization, to the secular authoritarians, such as the Ba’ath Party.8 
Scholars have also made a distinction between the various Islamic movements 
and groups based on the methods they adopt to forward their political and social goals 
                                                 
3 Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia (Singapore: Ridge Books, 2005), 28. 
4 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), 36. 
5 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Muslim World 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 4–5. 
6 James P. Piscatori, Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 5. 
7 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, 24. 
8 Angel M. Rabasa et al., The Muslim World after 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2004), 5-14. 
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and based on their readiness or willingness to accept and participate in the political 
structures of the state. Often, the distinction between “Moderates” and their “Radical” 
counterparts is based on the acceptance or rejection of the political regime of the state, 
willingness or unwillingness to participate in the political process, and their outlook 
towards working with state institutions to effect political change (in the case of the 
moderates) rather than to bring about violent revolutions and embark on mass 
mobilization (as is preferred by the radicals).9 Ayoob points out that many Islamic 
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Jamaat-i-Islam (JI) and the 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) in Pakistan, the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesia, and 
the Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS) have all participated in the mainstream political and 
social processes of the state, while the more radical (and fringe) movements, such as al-
Qaeda, have adopted an uncompromising stance and have resorted to violence.10 
Though the rise of political Islam and radicalism has been attributed to a number 
of seemingly intractable and overlapping causes and grievances that are present in the 
Muslim world, these explanations can be generally classified under four main camps. The 
first set of explanations suggests that Islamic radicalism is a response to severe political 
repression and corruption as well as the presence of autocratic and authoritarian rulers. 
Anderson, in her exploration of the Islamist movements in the Middle East and North 
Africa, suggests that Islamic radicalism occurs when a transparent system of political 
opposition does not exist and it is a result of government harassment and repression of 
lawful opposition. The regimes, in most cases, were unwilling to compromise and 
institute democratic reforms, and the opposition was treated as an “illegal” movement.11 
Hafez, focusing primarily on Islamic rebellion in Egypt and Algeria, suggests that “an ill-
fated combination of institutional exclusion on the one hand, and on the other, reactive 
and indiscriminate repression that threatens the organizational resource and personal lives 
                                                 
9 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 5. 
10 Mohamed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 17. 
11 Lisa Anderson, “Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism,” in Political Islam: 
Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, ed. John L. Esposito (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1997), 
17–29. 
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of Islamists…” causes them to rebel, and that, under such circumstances, Islamists 
“…undergo a near universal process of radicalization….”12 This has also been suggested 
by Fuller, who states that government repression and crackdowns force Islamists, who 
otherwise might have participated in the lawful political process, to adopt a more 
conspiratorial and sinister stance.13 
On the other hand, some other authors have sought to explain the rise of Islamic 
radicalism as a response to the presence of poverty and deprivation that is prevalent in the 
Muslim world, as well as to the failure of economic models that have been inspired by 
the West and implemented by pro-Western elite. As stated by Lewis, the “failure of 
modernization” is held by many in the Muslim world, to be the root cause of conditions 
of poverty and lack of economic opportunities.14 The rapid onslaught of modernity 
resulted in an increase in population and expansion in education, creating a large 
educated middle class with unbridled ambitions and aspirations, resulting in a growing 
gap between economic realities and personal aspirations.15 Economic failure created 
exponentially higher unemployment rates, as well as an abject hatred towards 
government authorities. As argued by Richards, poverty and unemployment increases the 
likelihood of youth joining the ranks of violent opposition movements,16 which are, in 
many cases, Islamic radical entities. Gerges also makes a similar argument, linking the 
presence of jihadi sentiments to structural problems present in the Arab world.17 
Closely tied with economic issues are the numerous transformations which arose 
due to rapid urbanization, congestion, and the introduction of predominantly Western 
ideas and influences, which challenged the traditional values. Displacement, as well as 
                                                 
12 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 21–22. 
13 Graham E. Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (2002): 51–52. 
14 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Random House Inc., 
2003), 113–119. 
15 Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful 
Coexistence? (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 99. 
16 Alan Richards, “Socio-economic Roots of Radicalism: Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic 
Radicals,” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph Series, US Army War College, 2003, 16–17. 
17 Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 286. 
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rapid social transformations that dismantled old societal norms and traditional support 
structures, created a sense of alienation.18 Modernization and its accompanying malaises 
were seen to create “valueless” and secular societies, resulting in moral degradation, 
societal decay, and spiritual vacuity. Given this displacement, alienation, and the barrage 
of alien values, many sought an “…anchor in religion” and “Islam offered a sense of 
identity, fraternity and cultural values….”19 
Feeding off of the malaises present in the Muslim world and supported by vested 
interests in states like Saudi Arabia, a new brand of radical Islam, modeled on 
Salafi/Jihadi ideologies, is also held accountable as a source of Islamic radicalism. Key 
ideological components of this ideology include the concept of takfir (excommunication 
or declaring a Muslim as an apostate), and the veneration of jihad as an obligation on all 
Muslims, especially during the Afghan war against the Soviets. This brand of Islam shuns 
all compromise with political authorities and draws a more political reading of the Quran. 
In addition, this more radical brand adopts a Manichean world view between the “dar el 
harb” (house of war) and the forces of Islam.20 Sparked off by the failure of Arab 
nationalism as well as the rise of Shia Khomeini as a champion of the Muslims, the 
Saudis began funneling in funds and resources to establish a vast network of like-minded 
Wahhabists. This movement funded charities, built mosques, and supported Islamic 
education in many developing countries in the Muslim world.21  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This study will employ the single case study method to analyze the rise of 
Islamism and radicalism in Maldives. The single case study method is preferred, first, 
because the phenomenon of Islamism in Maldives has not yet been studied, and therefore, 
                                                 
18 Hrair R. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse, NY.: 
Syracuse University Press, 1995). 
19 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 12–14. 
20 Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
2008), 94–126. See also Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism (New York: Routledge, 2009), 22–51. 




making any kind of generalization would be difficult. Second, the nature and trajectory of 
Islamism and the rise of Islamic radicalism differs from country to country, and by 
adopting the single case methodology, this study aims to analyze the phenomenon in the 
Maldivian context to either support or refute existing explanations. 
This study will primarily use secondary sources of information, including, but not 
limited to, journal articles, government policy papers, government databases, reports and 
other publications (from Maldives as well as from relevant foreign countries), and mass 
media sources such as print media and television reports. In addition, extensive use will 
be made of online sources, such as government websites and websites of other 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as propaganda material used 
by the radical and extremist elements. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will include six chapters overall, including the introductory chapter. 
Chapter II will elaborate briefly, on the history and politics of Islam in Maldives and its 
transformation over time. It also aims to identify the major Islamic political actors, their 
organizational structures, motivations, ideologies, their modus operandi and geographical 
dispersions. 
Chapter III will test the first hypothesis that the rise of Islamic radicalism in 
Maldives was facilitated by the exclusive political system that denied expressions of 
lawful dissent and political repression aimed against political opponents. This chapter 
also explores the relation between the state power apparatus and religion, how Islam was 
molded to suit the political expediency, and how it resulted in a political, as well as a 
religious, backlash. This chapter also explores the rise and trajectory of political Islam 
following the democratic reforms. 
Chapter IV will explore the second and third hypotheses forwarded in this study, 
namely that economic deprivation caused by economic failures, as well as social 
alienation and marginalization caused by modernization and excessive Westernization, 
resulted in an Islamic backlash and caused the rise of Islamic radicalism in Maldives. 
Socioeconomic issues go hand-in-hand with these economic failures and, for this reason, 
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this chapter addresses both these issues together. This chapter will explore factors such as 
the economic performance of Maldives, in addition to social indicators like crime and 
drug abuse rates that may have contributed to the rise of Islamic radicalism. This thesis 
will also address the disparity between the capital island Male’ and the outlying islands, 
as well as the impact of Western influences and social transformations. 
Chapter V will address the wave of ideology brought into Maldives by foreign-
educated Islamic ulema, as well as foreign terrorist recruiters operating in Maldives and 
their connection to the rise of Islamic radicalism in Maldives. This chapter will explore 
the ideological differences between the new brand of radical Islam and the traditional 
practices of Islam in Maldives, and how the newer ideologies are effecting social and 
religious change. This chapter also explores the activities of the foreign terrorist 
organizations and their recruiting agents, and how they are able to conduct their 
recruitment among the Maldivian youth. Finally, Chapter VI will conclude the study and 
present the overall assessment as well as possible policy recommendations, which may be 
helpful for the Maldivian authorities to implement in the fight against Islamic radicalism 
and terrorism. 
 10
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II. RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF THE MALDIVES 
A. PRE-ISLAMIC TRADITIONS 
The origins of the Maldivian people are shrouded in mystery, but it is strongly 
believed that the inhabitation of Maldives started around the same time as that of 
neighboring Sri Lanka.22 The Indian Ocean area, in which Maldives is located, was the 
center of much maritime traffic in ancient times. Numerous commercial vessels sailed 
these waters on their journeys to the Far East, as well as fishermen from the coastal areas 
of the Indian Ocean region; and, it is believed that, commercial interest or mere chance 
might have forced some of these seafarers to halt in Maldives. Ragupathy suggests that 
“Post-Indus maritime migrations, Iron Age in South India and Sri Lanka, Greco-Roman 
maritime trade—all contributed to the navigational activities of the first millennium 
B.C.” He goes on further to state that the “availability of cowries, turtle shells, ambergris 
etc. which were valuable commodities in the Asian trade, the possibility of providing 
services to the navigators, and shipwrecks might have made people settle in the 
Maldives.”23  
References to Maldives are found in the earliest canonical works of Sri Lanka, 
such as the Dipavamsa and the Mahavamsa, as well in such works of the Indian 
subcontinent. Similar accounts of Maldives have also been found in Greek and Chinese 
historical records, suggesting that Maldives has been populated for several millennia.24 
Archeological discoveries made in some islands of Maldives suggest that the 
intrepid explorers known as the Redin, a civilization centered on sun-worship, might have 
settled in Maldives as early as 1500 B.C.25 The Redin, who might have had some 
                                                 
22 H.C.P. Bell, The Maldive Island - An Account  of the Physical Features, Climate, History, 
Inhabitants, Production and Trade (Ceylon: Acting Government Printer, 1882), 21. 
23 Ponnampalam Ragupathy, The South Asian Heritage of Early Maldives, (Male’, Maldives: Science 
Education Center, 1993), 1. 
24 Clarence Maloney, “Where did the Maldives People Come From?” International Institute for Asian 
Studies, http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/iiasn5/insouasi/maloney.html (accessed July 20, 2011). 
25“Maldives,” Chicago Public Schools, Office of Language and Cultural Education, 
http://www.olce.org/pdfs/SOuth%20Asia/Maldives.pdf (accessed July 20, 2011). 
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affiliations with the foundational races of ancient civilizations such as Mesopotamia and 
Indus, revered the sun. They claimed to be descendants of the sun and considered it their 
chief deity. Statues with elongated ears, known to be the Redin’s creations, have been 
found in Maldives, suggesting that they might have pre-dated the Hindu and the Buddhist 
civilizations.26 
The Indian subcontinent and, more importantly, Gujrat are also cited as possible 
points of origin for those who would later populate Sri Lanka and Maldives. The 
foundational myths of Sri Lanka and the earliest canonical works of Buddhism contain 
references to Maldives. According to Maloney, Jataka No. 213, the Bharu Jataka, 
mentions an episode in which some people were exiled from the port city of Bharukaccha 
(modern Bharuch). These political exiles “…found standing room upon a thousand 
islands which are yet to be seen today about the island of Najikara.” Maloney asserts that 
the thousand islands referred to in the Jataka could only be Maldives, suggesting that 
Maldives might have been populated by political exiles from the established civilizations 
around it.27 
Around the same time that the Indo-Aryan people were migrating from the 
western parts of India, a parallel colonization by the Dravidian people from the southern 
part of India was also taking place in Sri Lanka. These Dravidians, particularly those 
from the Malabar Coast (the western coast of the subcontinent), were engaged in fishing 
and maritime navigation, and it is very likely that they settled in small island 
communities in Maldives.28 Due to the geography of Maldives and the relative isolation 
of individual islands, such settlements could have existed in ignorance of one another.  
Archeological evidence unearthed in Maldives suggests that the nation might have 
been subject to three different religious orders prior to the arrival of Islam. Though scant, 
evidence remains of the legendary seafarers known as the Redin and their religious order 
                                                 
26 Thor Heyerdahl, The Maldives Mystery (Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler Publishers, Inc., 
1986), 305–307. It should be noted that only a few scholars, such as the author strongly suggest such 
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of sun-worship. The duodecimal counting system traditionally used in the Maldives (with 
twelve as the base number), a few archeological findings, and local folklore are all that 
remains of this religion.29 
The other two religious orders that prevailed in Maldives were Hinduism and 
Buddhism. Hinduism may have predated Buddhism in Maldives, as it did on the 
subcontinent and elsewhere, or it might have been introduced at a later time.  As for 
Buddhism, archeological remains of temples, stupas, statues of Buddha, and other such 
items indicate that Maldives may have adhered to the Mahayana sect.30  
The remnants of these religious traditions are also reflected in the presence of the 
pseudo-religious magical practices locally known as fandita (probably derived from the 
term Pandit). This is a distillation of old religious practices and beliefs that exist parallel 
to the Islamic faith and, in many cases, have developed close affiliations with Islam.31 
Evidence of this is provided by the many local folklore and tales which effortlessly 
weave together stories of demons and evil spirits and brave and pious learned men who 
used the power of Islamic incantations and supplications to subdue the malicious forces. 
The local mythical folklore and demonology also reflect ideas which have been 
transmitted via the old religious traditions. For example, there are close parallels with 
Mother Goddess worship and there is a prevalence of folklore about beautiful, predatory 
female spirits known as Handi.32 
There are also local folktales reminiscent of the tale of the Hindu epic, Ramayana, 
as well as references to some Hindu Brahmins and Sages, such as Vashishta, who is 
locally known as Oditan Kaleygefaanu.  
                                                 
29 Thor Heyerdahl, The Maldives Mystery, 307. 
30 B. A. Ariyatilaka, “The Maldives: A Forgotten Buddhist Past,” Sri Lanka National Buddhist 
Authority, http://www.nbasrilanka.itgo.com/blank_6.htmlhttp://www.nbasrilanka.itgo.com/blank_6.html 
(accessed July 20, 2011). 
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Additionally, pagan or Hindu rites such as self-mutilation, which were conducted at 
religious ceremonies as shows of devotion to their deities, were exhibited for the 
entertainment of visiting dignitaries. Given an Islamic twist, such shows had been hosted 
as recently as 1835, almost 500 years after conversion to Islam.33 
B. CONVERSION TO ISLAM 
There are contending accounts about the arrival of Islam in Maldives. Some 
suggest that Islam was brought to Maldives in AD 1153 by a saint named Abul-Barakat 
al Barbari from Maghreb (though some claim that he actually came from the Sri Lankan 
port of Beruwala, which is often mispronounced as Barbarin), while other theories 
contend that it was a Persian saint named Yusuf Shamsuddin.34 And yet other theories, in 
a mix of the above two theories, suggest that Islam was introduced to Maldives in AD 
1338 by a saint named Abul-Barakat Yusuf al-Tabrezi.35  
There are also equally puzzling accounts of how and why Maldives converted to 
Islam. Some theories romanticize the account, wherein his faith in Islam enabled the saint 
in question to defeat a spiritual specter that had been haunting Maldives. So grateful was 
the Sultan that he readily converted to Islam and issued royal edicts calling all Maldivians 
to embrace the new religion. More likely, the conversion might have been fuelled by the 
more pragmatic politico-economic intention of tapping into the growing influence of 
Arab traders in the region,36 as well as designs by the Maldives ruler to minimize 
growing power of the Buddhist priesthood and, thus, the power of the nearby Buddhist 
kingdom of Sri Lanka.37 It is interesting to note that several accounts of the conversion 
tale exist within Maldivian society, some painting it as a parody of the elites who wanted 
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to ingratiate themselves to the new power in the region and the more popular rendition 
which is based on royal predation. 38 
The conversion to Islam is the single most important event in Maldivian history. 
The period prior to the conversion is derisively referred to as jahiliyya (period of 
ignorance), and the conversion is hailed as the Spiritual Revolution. That being said, 
though everyone was compelled to convert to Islam by royal decree, some islands held on 
to the religion of their forefathers and refused to destroy the temples and other places of 
Buddhist worship. Many saw this as a transient fad imposed by Arab traders who had 
beguiled the king, thus many islanders covered the temples, idols and other objects of 
worship under mounds of earth with the intention of resurrecting them later.39 As a result, 
in many parts of Maldives, open rebellion against the new faith broke out, prompting the 
king to dispatch forces from the capital to force the conversion.  
Islam in Maldives survived and thrived, especially during the turbulent period of 
early conversion, because it continued to receive royal patronage from the Sultans who 
were the official and ultimate guarantors of the faith. Following conversion, the Sultan 
ordered for mosques and madrassas to be built across the country, in order to instruct and 
guide people to the new faith. Additionally, Islamic law, Sharia, was made the basis for 
the legal system of Maldives, and Islam impacted the social norms, customs and 
traditions of the nation.40 
Despite these measures, Islam in Maldives underwent tremendous modification 
over the years due to the lingering presence of other religions and the highly matriarchal 
social order that was prevalent throughout the Lakshadweep archipelago.41 This resulted 
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in wide acceptance for un-Islamic practices, many of which were recorded by the famed 
traveler and Islamic scholar Ibn-Batuta, who resided in Maldives for a period of time and 
was made a ‘Qadi’ (Islamic Judge). According to his accounts, Maldivian women were 
highly liberal and went about in public without the traditional Islamic veil (burqah) and 
instead wearing only a piece of cloth wrapped around their lower bodies.42 Also, many 
women, after having being divorced, remained in the home of their former husbands until 
remarriage. Ibn-Batuta’s arrival also coincided with the reign of Queen Khadijah 
(Rehendi Khadeejah), who reigned despite Islamic norms, which forbade women from 
assuming public office.43  
Other recorded instances of un-Islamic practices includes that of the Chief Islamic 
Cleric (as well as the Chief Justice) at the royal court sending out annual missives to the 
islanders to educate them on religious matters, mostly pertaining to correct performance 
of ablutions or observance of basic religious tenets.44 This was also recorded by Clarence 
Maloney, one of the first (and lamentably few) foreign social scientists to do research on 
Maldives. He gives the account of a conversation with a local cleric who told him that 
Islam, for most Maldivians, was a matter of ablution, fasting, and mumbling 
incomprehensible Arabic supplications.45 
Isolation from Islamic centers and the rich cultural history of Maldives that 
predated the arrival of Islam had tremendous impact on the way that Islam was perceived 
and practiced and Islam, at best, remained a sub-stratum of culture.46 This has been 
observed in other cultures which have dealt with waves of Islamization, where the 
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process of transmogrification and modification of the religion to accommodate social 
practices has occurred. This supports the earlier theory that Islamization and participation 
in the more ‘universal’ culture of Islam was a political policy adopted by the elite. 
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III. POLITICS AND ISLAM IN THE MALDIVES 
A. POLITICAL SYSTEM OF MALDIVE PRIOR TO 1968 
The political landscape of Maldives has undergone tremendous change with the 
initiation of the democratic reform process, which started (in earnest) in 2003. Since 
2003, there has been considerable attention and effort devoted to creating political 
structures and institutions that are more suited to the ideals and image of democracy to 
which Maldives aspires. Examples of these changes include the creation and operation of 
political parties and the effective delineation of power between the different branches of 
the government. There have also been efforts to create greater political and 
socioeconomic decentralization by establishing and empowering local governing 
authorities such as city councils. 
Maldives arrived at this juncture with a rich and varied political history that was 
uniquely Maldivian. It was not modeled on the political systems prevalent in the region 
or the political system found in any other Islamic state. According to Maloney, “The 
landscape of the Maldives is so unusual that the political system which glues the pieces 
together and channels social control is also unusual.”47 Furthermore, he also asserts that, 
“the form of government is Maldivian, with two millennia of adaptation to the peculiar 
requirements of the fragmented landscape and culture history of the country.”48 
Up until 1968, Maldives had been a Sultanate (except for the brief period of the 
first republic). Throughout Maldives’ history, beginning with the seminal event of 
Islamic conversion, there have been 89 Sultans and 3 Sultanas who reigned over 
Maldives. Though Sultanic law was based on hereditary right to the throne, political 
succession was often decided through messy squabbles, coups, and violent upheavals.49  
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The constant coups and counter-coups, which were characteristic of the Sultanistic era, 
set the tone of “distrust and political fear, of furtive whispering, (which was) especially 
prevalent in Male’.”50 That being said, the Sultans of Maldives were mostly benign 
autocrats, who ruled benevolently.51 They were, according to Phadnis and Luithui, 
benevolent, oligarchic rulers.52 In fact, amongst Maldives’ Sultans, there was a tradition 
of official acquiescence to public pressure, which often saw powerful persons being 
removed from political office.53  
Traditionally, the Sultanate had functioned through a hold on the political and 
economic systems of the society. According to Phadnis and Luithui, little changed in the 
political system following the Islamic conversion, except that Islam was added to the 
organizational dimensions of the political system, and also imbued Maldives’ politics 
with a religious fervor.54 Following the conversion, the Sultans derived their political 
authority from the Islamic Sharia base, and they exercised religious control over the 
population through the chief Islamic cleric, the Qazi (Fan’diyaru in the local language), 
and other religious officials.55 
Centralized ruling power came from the Sultan, who was based in the capital, 
Male’, and was translated into political control at the atoll and island levels by island 
chiefs (Katheebu) and atoll chiefs (Atholhu Verin)  who were selected by the 
administration in Male’. Most, if not all, islands also had Qadis, who, along with the 
island chiefs, exercised political and judicial control over the islands. 
The ecclesiastical order and the political order were arranged in a rather 
complicated manner. The Sultan, despite deriving his power from the tenets of Islamic 
Sharia law, acted as a secular ruler. The religious order was subordinate to the secular 
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ruling order, and this arrangement was largely maintained, though there were a few 
instances when the Qazi would assume the throne as a Sultan.56 The unique position of 
the Sultan as the protector of the Islamic faith and the tenets of Sharia had been handed 
down from generation to generation and formed part of the political structure of the state. 
B. MALDIVES UNDER COLONIZATION 
Waning Arab power in the Indian Ocean region coincided with the arrival of 
European colonial powers into the region. During this time, Maldives was able to remain 
independent, expect for a brief spell during the 17th century when it was colonized by the 
Portuguese. The Portuguese occupation of Maldives was facilitated by the Sultan, Hassan 
the IX (known as Dom Manoel after baptism), who adopted Christianity and soon after 
migrated to Goa and remained under Portuguese protection. The Portuguese established 
themselves in the capital, Male’, and dispatched their representatives all over Maldives. 
They ruled over Maldives from 1558 to 1573 and were finally ousted after 17 years of 
occupation by a local hero named Mohamed Thakurufaanu and his band of followers, 
who waged a campaign of insurgency against the foreign invaders. After their expulsion, 
Mohamed Thakurufaanu was declared as the Sultan. Following his accession to the 
throne, he instituted several measures to curb the Christian practices that had started to 
creep into the life of Islamic Maldives. In some instances, he dispatched military force 
from the capital to force people back to the Islamic faith. 57 
Furthermore, the Sultans also enlisted the help of Sheikh Muhammad Jamaluddin, 
a learned Islamic scholar, who had recently returned from studies abroad in Hadramut, 
Yemen, and made him the Chief Qadi of the realm.  Under the advice of the new Qadi, 
the Shafi code of Sunni Islam was made the official religious code in Maldives,58 and the 
message was preached that Maldives had succumbed to Portuguese occupation due to its 
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failure to observe and adhere to the tenets of Islam. It can be argued that this was the first 
Islamic revivalism experienced in Maldives. It is a common phenomenon in many 
Islamic societies to turn towards Islam in times of such crises and adopt much more 
stringent laws and legal codes. This helps coalesce the population and allows people an 
illusion of control over their external environments.  
 Maldives was subject to several such waves of colonization and occupation, 
mostly originating from the Malabar Coast of India. Such forays rarely managed to 
establish a foothold and had little impact on the Maldivian society and its Islamic 
character. Portuguese colonial power in the Indian Ocean region slowly gave way to the 
Dutch and finally to the British, who were the next European power to hold sway over 
Maldives. 
 In 1887, Maldives signed a treaty agreement with the British Empire and 
Maldives was declared a British Protectorate. The British were content to direct the 
foreign affairs of Maldives, and did not interfere with its internal administration, which 
was left to the local Sultan. They were not interested in establishing missionary outposts 
or entangling themselves in the internal squabbles of the islanders. It was only when 
Japan began its series of invasions during World War II that the British seriously 
considered making use of Maldives as an airbase.59 But, even this interest was short-
lived, and in the military retrenchment and decolonization process, Maldives was granted 
independence and the British relinquished control over their airbase in 1967. 
C. TRANSFORMATION FROM A SULTANATE TO A REPUBLIC 
Local political intrigue, internecine squabbling, and rivalry for power among the 
leading political figures set the tone that led up to the change in Maldives’ political 
system. Even prior to the political reform, the power of the Sultan had been slowly 
eroding. In 1932, under the behest of the British government in Ceylon, political reform 
was undertaken, resulting in the first written constitution of the Maldives. Under the new 
constitution, framed on December 22, 1932, the position of the Sultan no longer remained 
hereditary, but was to be decided on the basis of an election. A Citizens’ Majlis 
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(Parliament) was convened under the Sultan and the Majlis, along with the Sultan, the 
Chief Minister, and the qadis, comprised the political power in Maldives. 
Maldives became a republic under a highly Anglicized elite, led by the first 
President, Mohammed Amin Didi, who had served in various capacities under the 
administration of the Sultan and who was related to the royal family. Leading up to the 
political transformation, Amin began assuming increasing power in local political affairs, 
due, in large part, to the fact that the incumbent monarch, Hassan Fareed, left Amin in 
charge of running the state while Fareed resided in Ceylon. Left largely unchecked, Amin 
had free rein in crafting policies for Maldives. Some of his policies, such as education for 
girls, promotion of local cultivation, and the introduction of several modern innovations, 
were well received. On the other hand, some other policies, such as the centralization of 
trade in dried fish, the ban on tobacco, and the strict implementation of the Islamic Sharia 
law, were seen by many to be too radical and avant-garde for the times. Despite being a 
100% Islamic state, the application of the strictest tenets of the Sharia, such as stoning 
adulterers and cutting the hands of thieves, were not been implemented in Maldives.  In 
addition to these new policies, Amin instituted several controversial projects across 
Maldives, most notable being the clearing of vast tracts of scarce cultivable land to build 
wide avenues on all of the islands. He forced local islanders to work on these projects, 
which interfered with jobs that provided their daily livelihoods and increased their 
economic plight.60 
During the period from 1943 to1953, Maldives was ruled by a regency council 
within the Majlis, which was convened when Sultan Hassan Nooraddeen abdicated the 
throne. The power structure of the Sultanate had crumbled, and though there were 
numerous contenders for the throne, many wanted Abdul Majeed, the previous Chief 
Minister under Sultan Shamsuddeen, to assume the throne. Despite this, Majeed resided 
in Egypt, returning infrequently to Maldives, and refused repeated pleas to ascend the 
throne. Nevertheless, he exercised considerable power in local affairs, and was 
instrumental in the political direction of Maldives during these turbulent times. The 
                                                 
60 Maloney, People of the Maldives Islands, 200–201. 
 
 24
intensity and nature of the political friction during the time leading up to the political 
transformation of Maldives from a Sultanate to a Republic state can be understood when 
considering the fact that Maldives adopted and discarded six constitutions before finally 
settling on the seventh one that instituted political change.  
In April 1952, a general referendum was held among the people of the Maldives 
to decide the political future of the country, and the majority decision was for Maldives to 
become a republic. This move was due in part to the death of Abdul Majeed, the prior 
Sultan-designate, who had died earlier in the year. Once a republic, Mohammed Amin 
Didi was elected as Maldives’ first president, with almost 96% of the votes. The seventh 
constitution of Maldives, enacted under Amin, included many progressive elements such 
as the enfranchisement of women, but failed to include important elements of basic civil 
liberties and other rights, which had been part of earlier constitutions.61 
Ultimately, this first republic experiment ended with a coup and a violent 
uprising. The general public had become increasingly frustrated with the failure of the 
government to alleviate their economic conditions. Furthermore, many were of the view 
that Amin’s administration was excessively corrupt and that he diverted the scant 
resources the state had towards maintaining his numerous lovers and female friends. So, 
while Amin was traveling abroad for medical reasons, the general public met with the 
Vice President, Muhammad Ibrahim Didi, and encouraged him to take over the 
government. Upon his return from Ceylon, Amin was apprised of the change in power 
and he was retained on an island nearby the capital for his safety. While remaining there, 
he enlisted the help of a few loyalists and engineered a counter-coup, which ultimately 
failed. During the counter-coup, Amin had gone to Male’; intent on re-taking power from 
the usurper, but a mob attacked him and injured him severely. A trial was held and the 
chief instigators were exiled for life, and Amin remained under exile until his death in 
1954. In the end, Maldives reverted back to being a Sultanate, and Mohamed Fareed 
assumed the throne. 
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In retrospect, the reason for the first republic’s failure may be attributed to the 
many changes that Amin instituted, particularly his programs for the emancipation of 
women and his socioeconomic designs, appeared to be too radical for the general 
population at the time,62 especially for the more conservative elements within the society. 
The period between 1954 and 1965 was marked with increased internal political 
tension, resulting from the presence of the British on some of Maldives’ atolls and also 
due to the adverse economic conditions under which Maldivians had been forced to live 
for a long time. Fissiparous tendencies had developed in some parts of Maldives, 
especially in the southern atolls, which greatly benefited from having British airbases 
established there. Having developed economic ties with a global power, the southern 
atolls were not content with the centralized system of trade which was conducted through 
Male’, especially in the aftermath of the economic crises that befell Maldives following 
the drop in the export value of dried fish. These atolls rose in revolt and declared the 
Republic of Suvadive Islands, but these revolutionary activities were brutally quashed 
under the direction of the Prime Minister of the time, Ibrahim Nasir.63 In July 1965, 
Maldives gained full independence from the British, though the British continue to 
remain in the southern-most atolls as per the terms of the treaty they had negotiated 
during the reign of Sultan Mohamed Fareed, which has allowed them to establish and 
operate an airbase in Maldives. 
Following Maldives independence from Britain, a second referendum was held to 
decide the political future of the country. The Maldivian population was, again, in favor 
of a republic. In November 1968, Ibrahim Nasir was sworn in as the first president of the 
second republic of the Maldives, and the Sultanate was decidedly expunged. But, despite 
Maldives’ change from a Sultanate to a republic state, there was not much change in the 
nature and mode of governance because many of the institutions which ushered in 
democratic norms, independent legislative, and judiciary branches were not allowed to 
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operate due to the overwhelming power that was centralized in the hands of the President. 
Additionally, the second republic did not allow the existence of political parties. The 
constitutional scheme, which was introduced in 1967, dictated that the Majlis nominate 
one candidate for the post of the president. The candidate, thus vetted and passed by the 
Majlis, then had to secure more than 51% of public approval through a general ballot.  
Constitutional amendments undertaken in 1970, 1972, and 1975 gave almost 
unlimited power to the President. According to the constitution, the president was also 
the supreme authority entrusted with propagating and protecting the Islamic faith of the 
country. The administration of justice and the implementation of Sharia were to be 
handled by a body nominated by the President.64 
Political consolidation, regime protection, and maintaining sovereign integrity in 
the face of separatist tendencies played a big role during the formative years of Maldivian 
statehood. These elements contributed heavily to the closed and exclusive political 
system and, in some ways, they were as influential as the legacy of the Sultanistic era and 
culture. As stated by Maloney, “strong individual leadership” often characterized by the 
assumption of almost-dictatorial powers and a single-minded drive towards entrenchment 
of one’s own position “…is acceptable in the light of the traditional Maldivian polity…”65 
In a system riven with internal squabbling and conspiratorial rivalry, the position of the 
Sultan (or later, that of the President) has to be secured through undermining political 
opposition and meeting any challenges to one’s authority with absolute repression. 
President Nasir, for example, had to contend with several perceived and real challenges 
to his authority; most notable was the challenge from his Prime Minister, Ahmed Zaki. 
President Nasir reacted to the incident by dismantling several ministries and exiling Zaki 
and several other top officials who he believed had conspired against him and who had 
pushed for a ‘no-confidence’ motion within the Majlis.66 Nasir was also quick to 
implement safeguards against any further challenges to his supreme power. To this end, 
he directed further constitutional amendments by abolishing the post of the Prime 
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Minister and, in lieu, instituted the posts of four Vice Presidents who held executive 
power.67 
In 1978, after having served two terms as president, Nasir indicated that, for 
various reasons, he did not wish to run for a third time, despite there being no 
constitutional limit on the number of terms a person could hold the office of the 
presidency. Before this decision was announced, the position of the alternate candidate 
was filled by Maumoon Abdul Qayoom, who was serving as the Minister for Transport in 
Nasir’s regime. In the same conspiratorial traditions which owe their origins to the times 
of the Sultanate, there had been furtive power-brokering within the Majlis as well as the 
elite cliques in determining this alternate candidate. In the second round of nominations, 
after having being apprised of Nasir’s desire not to contend for election, the majority of 
the votes in the Majlis went to Qayoom. And, following the tenuous period that was 
fraught with fears of a reprisal by President Nasir, the nomination of the Majlis was put 
to the ultimate test of a public referendum, which Qayoom won with over 90% of the 
votes. On November 11, 1978, Qayoom was sworn in as the second President of 
Maldives. 
 Qayoom had been educated in Islamic sharia at Al Azhar University in Egypt in 
the 1950s. After having filled some instructional posts in Nigeria, Qayoom returned to 
Maldives in 1971 and began to serve as a lecturer in a government-run school. He was a 
strong critic of the government, especially on the issue of tourism and the sale of alcohol, 
which he maintained was against the tenets of Islam. Because of this criticism, Qayoom 
was placed under house arrest and then banished from Maldives in 1973. Eventually, he 
was brought back to Maldives to work under the administration of President Nasir as an 
Under Secretary at the Telecommunications Department in 1974.68 He was then made the 
Deputy Ambassador of Maldives in Sri Lanka and later became Maldives’.69 His political 
career and his relationship with President Nasir’s administration underwent dramatic ups 
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and downs until he became the Minister of Transport, a post which he held until he 
became the President in 1978. 
As mentioned previously, under the Maldivian Constitution, the President is 
considered the ‘supreme authority’ and is charged with protecting and promoting the 
tenets of Islam.70 In this respect, Qayoom initiated several policies during his 30-year rule 
that would move Islam into the mainstream social and political discourse of the country. 
One of these initiatives includes the creation of Mauhadu-al Dhiraasaathul Islamiyya, an 
educational institute dedicated solely to Islamic studies, which was established in 1980. 
In 1984, with assistance from Islamic states such as Pakistan, Brunei, and the states of the 
Persian Gulf, the Islamic Center of Maldives was constructed in Male’. This building 
houses a grand mosque and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs (formerly known as the 
Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs). During the initial years of his rule, diplomatic ties 
with many of the Islamic states of the Persian Gulf were established, and Maldives 
started to play a more prominent role in the Organization of the Islamic Countries. All 
these developments enabled Maldives to garner increased assistance from these states, 
especially in fields like education. It was at this time that significant numbers of 
Maldivian youth began attending various Islamic education institutes in places such as 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and India. These youth later became the vanguard of the 
Islamic revivalist movement in Maldives.71 
Additionally, Qayoom utilized his religious personae by appearing and lecturing 
at many of the important religious functions in Maldives.72 Noteworthy in this respect is 
the annual religious program conducted during the Islamic month of fasting (Ramadan), 
in which Qayoom was a permanent fixture. He also frequently delivered the Friday 
sermons at various mosques in Maldives, led the nation in prayer, and appeared on 
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religious programs aired by the national television and radio stations. Even during his 
years of banishment, Qayoom took up preaching and leading the prayer congregation as 
an ‘imam.’73 
All these initiatives served to create and help nurture the image of Qayoom as the 
supreme authority of religion in Maldives. Evidence suggests that this was a position that 
he jealously guarded; and he brooked no opposition on religious matters, even from 
among his religious clique, which consisted of persons more highly educated than 
Qayoom. There were numerous instances when Islamic scholars were asked to retract 
their statements if it opposed something that Qayoom had said and whole shows were 
even cancelled because they had aired controversial themes, thus inviting Qayoom’s ire.74 
Another important aspect of the religious changes in Maldives was that Qayoom’s 
regime adopted and propagated an almost exclusive strand of Islam which was dubbed as 
‘moderate and tolerant.’ This was played out to two audiences: the larger international 
community, in order to attract greater aid and investments for Maldives, and, more 
importantly, to the local community, to eradicate religious extremism and ‘deviant’ 
practices. Numerous religious clerics and scholars were subject to government 
oppression, torture, and banishment for failing to side with the government and for airing 
religious views contrary to what was being advocated by the government.75  
The additional economic rationale for this strategy was that by promoting 
moderate Islam, Qayoom was able to project Maldives as a safe haven for the nascent 
tourism industry. This allowed the government to attract greater foreign investments and 
assured local investors, who were a majority of those backing the regime. This also 
served foreign policy goals, because Maldives, under Qayoom’s flag of Islamic 
statehood, was able to tap into the vast funds of the oil-rich Gulf States; numerous 
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development projects were sponsored in the Maldives and it facilitated borrowing on 
easier terms. It also enabled Maldives to play an increasingly prolific role at the 
international level, particularly as a leader on climate issues and as a champion of the 
cause for small states.  
Though he initiated religious and social reformation and is responsible for many 
of the modern developments instituted in Maldives, Qayoom’s use of repressive measures 
had ultimate outcomes that were beyond his control. First, it helped galvanize a religious 
movement that was more insidious, latent, and covert, evidenced by the rapid slew that 
Maldivian society took towards religious conservatism towards the end of his 30-year 
rule. Any person or group that opposed Qayoom were automatically deemed heretics, 
deviants, or, at best, ‘enemies of Islam.’76 Yet, while this adoption and promotion of a 
single strand of Islam enabled Qayoom to establish himself as the leading religious 
authority in Maldives, it also allowed the government to employ its repressive 
instruments against radical and extremist pockets that were spread across the country. 
Second, by using repression equally against expressions of religious and political dissent, 
he forced the development of an alliance between the political and the religious who 
opposed Qayoom’s policies. The fruition of this was evident during the run-up to the first 
ever multiparty elections when public opinion was swayed as much by the political 
momentum of the opposition as it was by the nightly prayer session held by Islamic 
clerics within the opposition who were denouncing Qayoom’s regime and “praying for 
deliverance.” 
In essence, Qayoom’s use of religion to cement his political position was borne 
out of the false notion that Islam makes no distinction between religious authority and 
temporary political power. It is this false notion that allows leaders in Islamic states to 
tighten their grip on power, practice widespread nepotism, corruption, and other deviant 
practices without fear of opposition. Islamic teachings used in these contexts stress on the 
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importance of paying allegiance and loyalty to the leader, and staying away from fitna 
(subversion) as long as the leader ensures security of the realm and does not force 
irreligious practices upon the people.77 Under Qayoom’s rule, Islam began to take a more 
central place in the social sphere as well, evidenced by the growing conservatism, which 
was much aided by the return of Islamic clerics who had attended Islamic institutes 
abroad. The consequences of Qayoom’s religious policies enabled Islam to gain a 
political persona and potency. Forging a national identity based on religion is natural, and 
might have been critical for the survival of Qayoom’s regime,78 but as Ayoob points out, 
it invites religion to make broader and deeper forays into the society until it finally 
becomes entrenched as a viable political platform.79  
D. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MALDIVES 
A watershed in Maldives politics took place in 2005 when, for the first time, 
political parties were allowed to operate in Maldives. Following this landmark change, 
the political scene of Maldives was radically transformed. Major political parties, such as 
the Maldives Democratic Party (MDP–former opposing party) and the Maldives Peoples’ 
Party (DRP–locally known as Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party founded by former president 
Qayoom), were quick to entrench themselves, and smaller political parties, such as the 
Republican Party (Jumhooree Party–JP) and the Social Liberal Party, also emerged soon 
thereafter. Within a short span of time, political parties began to occupy center stage in 
the national discourse of Maldives.80 
Today, the politico-religious discourse in Maldives falls along two main lines: one 
discourse is used by all political parties against the others to brand them as heretics and 
anti-Islamic. This type of discourse is primarily used by DRP to target the MDP, which 
DRP claims is pro-secularism and supported by a global Christian network as part of their 
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proselytizing efforts and grand strategy to weaken Islamic states everywhere.81 The other 
discourse is centered on the rise of Islamic radicalism and extremism in the Maldives, 
and discusses how DRP and, more aptly, the former regime supported the rise of Islamic 
militancy and even nurtured it, thus creating the menace of Islamic extremism. 
Against these two discourses, there is a newly emergent discourse that places 
Islam in the center of politics. Islamic political parties, namely the now defunct Islamic 
Democratic Party (IDP) and the Adaalath Party–AP (Justice Party), were established in 
the first wave of political parties, but since then they have been contending for political 
space with the more established political parties. IDP was present in the first multi-party 
presidential elections and gained an insignificant 1.39% (less than 2,500 votes), and since 
then, its leader, Umar Naseer has joined with DRP. In the 2008 presidential election, AP 
backed the Jumhooree Party (JP) candidate in the first round and managed to get 15% of 
the votes, and in the runoff elections, the opposition formed a coalition, led by MDP to 
oust Qayoom and elect Mohamed Nasheed, the incumbent President.82  
Ideologically, the AP is dedicated to preserving and propagating Islamic faith in 
Maldives and establishing the rule of Sharia. They are part of the Islamic revivalist 
movement in Maldives and many of their leaders are Islamic clerics who had been 
educated in places like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Malaysia. These foreign educated 
clerics, upon their return to Maldives, had been largely sidelined or oppressed under 
Qayoom’s regime for their refusal to accept his ideology of ‘moderate Islam.’ So, when a 
political opening presented itself, they were quick to capitalize on it, thus paving the way 
for Islamic revivalism to enter the political discourse in Maldives. The AP has been 
openly critical of the Islamic policies that were instituted by Qayoom. They claim that the 
Islamic nature of the policies was manipulated to suit the political strategies of the 
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government and their efforts are aimed at establishing the unblemished religious truths 
and practices in Maldives. Ideally, they aim to encourage religious practices as they were 
during the earlier days of Islam. 
Coalition politics was not well-suited for the AP, which, since the 2008 election, 
has become the sole political representative of Islam in the local political scene.83 While 
they were given the mandate of running the Islamic ministry and overseeing the conduct 
of religious activities, and had control over religions institutions in the country, there 
were tensions apparent within the coalition even from the outset. The AP has been critical 
of several of the government’s policies, most notable being the relaxation of Maldives’ 
attitude towards Israel and the possibility of forging diplomatic ties  with the “Zionist” 
state. As a result of this policy, the AP was among the chief instigators that conducted 
rallies in the capital against the government’s decision to grant permission to a team of 
Israeli doctors who intended to visit and treat patients in Maldives.84 The AP also 
opposed the government’s policies regarding reinstituting co-education in Maldives,85 
and they were openly critical, to the point of leading the public in rallies, when the 
government attempted to relocate the only school dedicated to teaching Arabic in 
Maldives. This was a particularly significant issue for the AP as attending the school is an 
important stepping stone for Maldivians wishing to pursue Islamic education abroad.86 
Other contentious issues between the AP and the coalition government included 
recent moves to legalize the sale of alcohol and pork in hotels located on inhabited 
islands;87 this is a policy that the government claimed would attract a greater number of 
visitors and would better support local island economies. The AP claimed that the sale of 
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alcohol and pork is haram (forbidden according to the tenets of Islam) and the group 
resorted to public rallies (yet again) to force the government to retract the regulation.88 
Political parties that have taken on the mantle of religious ideologies are hard-
pressed when demanded to play coalition politics, especially when they form part of a 
disparate coalition that was formed for political expediency, as it happened in Maldives. 
The AP’s repeated poor electoral performances in Maldives (even at the parliamentary 
and local council levels) suggests that its support base is increasingly frustrated with its 
compromises as part of the coalition, especially since policies like co-education and 
diplomatic ties with Israel have not been thwarted. 
In addition to its involvement in a disparate coalition, the AP has also been 
stymied in its political aspirations due to its lack of a coherent policy for governance, 
especially on the economic front. While many Maldivians see a possible AP government 
ushering in relief for social issues with a ban on drug abuse and policies to fight the 
increasing gang violence in Maldives, the AP’s failure to articulate a sound economic 
policy and its negative outlook on the tourism industry and diplomatic ties with the West 
are concerns that make Maldivians wary of the political party.  
The rise of political Islam in Maldives, as evident from the events discussed 
previously, is due to a combination of factors; namely, the use of Islam to legitimize the 
regime and gain political ascendancy in a highly exclusive political system, and the use 
of repression to curb political opposition. Qayoom’s tendency to use Islam to undergird 
his regime and sustain his rule served to move Islam into the political consciousness of 
the country. From this, Islam became a viable political platform. 
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IV. MODERNIZATION AND ISLAM IN MALDIVES 
A. TRADITIONAL SOCIETY AND ETHOS 
Maldives has long been at the cultural and economic crossroads of the Indian 
Ocean region. With a rich history as a nation of fishermen and seafarers, and as an 
important port of call for the busy ocean-going traffic, Maldives was influenced by great 
civilizations, both near and far. Thus, Maldivian culture was a mosaic of different 
traditions, customs, and norms borrowed from the many travelers who visited its shores. 
Yet, despite all of its contact with foreign travelers, Maldivian society was one 
bound by traditions and customs that had been formed over a long period of time, and 
which provided social lubrication to ease the friction of living in small communities and 
under harsh conditions. Large extended families tended to live together and acted as a 
security net for the younger generations. Island society was characterized by families 
who were connected to one another through intermarriages or kinship ties. As such, these 
were very close-knit communities. People came to one another’s aid, especially in 
carrying out tasks such as building and repairing boats, the sowing and harvesting of 
crops, and they also supported one another during major events such as festivals and 
celebrations.  
Maloney describes the Maldivian society as one bound by deep–seeded traditions 
that gave Maldivians a sense of profound pragmatism. Islam, according to Maloney, also 
gave Maldivians a very strong and rigid sense of control over their personal behavior and 
social activities. According to Maloney, “Dhivehis are encultured from an early age to 
suppress emotions, for emotions could easily become threatening to small population 
groups on small islands.”89 The stoicism demanded by harsh island life and rigid Islamic 
orthopraxy enabled Maldivians to reject those worldviews that were contrary to the 
comfortable frames of reference which they already had. That being said, Maldivians, 
Maloney goes on to say, also had a sense of their cultural marginality.90  
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Maldives adopted Islam in order to tap into the flow of Arabian commerce that 
was crisscrossing the Indian Ocean,91 but even after conversion, it remained a tiny state 
that was surrounded by larger powers that were either Hindu or Buddhist. Maldives had 
been subject to waves of invasion and colonization by these powers and conversion to 
Islam was one way of breaking the religious ties with its surrounding states; thus, this 
prevented Maldives from ultimately being subsumed under their hold. The Maldivians 
saw that those states in the Islamic seat of power were too distant to present a danger of 
this nature and, thus, Maldives became an Islamic state to prevent the Hindu’s and 
Buddhist’s increasingly belligerent and hegemonic overtures. 
The conversion to Islam meant that Maldives was different in terms of religion 
from its neighbors. In addition, the cultural marginality of Maldivians was further 
reinforced by the small population of Maldives. This small population was the ultimate 
guardian of the sovereign territory, a unique language, a distinctly Maldivian culture and 
tradition, a rich history, and its Islamic faith, which were constantly under attack from 
those around it. Under such circumstances, adherence to traditions and cultural norms 
were critical. They provided the Maldivians with the inner strength to reject and abstain 
from elements which might weaken the institutions of Maldivian nationhood and that of 
its society. Conversion to Islam also provided a break from the ancient cultural influences 
that had shaped the social and religious system of Maldives prior to the advent of Islam.  
Islam took root in the Maldives through a slow process which had many ups and 
downs. Patronage by the Sultan and the use of the coercive instruments of the state meant 
that Islam gained in strength over time. The growing strength of Islam was accompanied 
by a parallel weakening of the traditional Dravidian kinship system, as well as the older 
religious and social traditions. The older traditions, as stated above, did not get expunged 
completely, but were incorporated into the new religious and social system, to produce a 
modified system that was decidedly Islamic.  
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B. ADVENT OF MODERNIZATION IN MALDIVES 
Similar to the majority of other tradition-bound societies, Maldives is also 
undergoing dramatic socioeconomic changes brought in by the effects of modernization 
and Westernization. Among these changes have been an increase in numerous 
socioeconomic problems such as over-crowding (especially in Male’ and some regional 
capitals), increasing crime rates, gang-related violence, and a widespread culture of drug 
abuse among the youth. There is also a growing middle class population, youth 
unemployment, and a disparity between the capital and the atolls in terms of living 
conditions, provision of basic amenities, and public services. 
 Of course, modernization has not been all bad for Maldives. The introduction of 
modern healthcare and the dissemination of knowledge, especially in areas like infant 
care, general hygiene, and the importance of nutritious diets, greatly helped to reduce 
infant and child mortality rates in Maldives, especially after the 1970s. Between 1970 and 
2000, the population of Maldives had increased by more than two-fold (from 114,469 in 
1970 to 270,101 in 2000).92  This demographic shift means that there is a larger 
population of working age now than ever before in Maldives.93 
Though the economy has expanded, especially in important sectors like tourism 
and other tertiary services, this expansion has not been felt equally across all of Maldives. 
A very significant portion of the governmental development projects were focused on 
creating more infrastructures and services in and around the capital island, Male’. 
Noteworthy in this respect is the first international airport built in the Maldives during the 
presidency of Nasir. The airport was built on an island only about a mile from Male’. As 
this was the only viable option for tourists to come in and go out of the country, the first 
tourist resorts were also developed in close proximity to Male’. Additionally, Male’ was 
the commercial center of Maldives. All imports and the few local exports had to pass 
through customs which was based in Male’. This meant that the atolls had to rely solely 
on Male’ to receive everything from dietary staples, such as rice and flour, to 
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construction material and other miscellaneous items, such as books, toys, and clothing. 
Additionally, important economic and commercial functions such as banking, currency 
exchange, and insurance were also centralized in Male’.  
Male’, apart from being the economic hub of the country, is also the seat of the 
government. There was only nominal representation of the government ministries and 
departments in the atolls; all the functions and services of the government were 
centralized in Male’. Male’ also had a monopoly on healthcare, quality education, and 
other basic facilities, such as 24-hour electricity. For example, even up until 2000, Male’ 
had the only higher secondary school (teaching grades 11 and 12). The numerous schools 
established in the atolls were inadequately staffed, poorly administered, and very often 
under-equipped. In most cases, island schools only taught children up until grades 5 or 7, 
after which those children who wished to pursue higher education were forced to move to 
another island, which had a Atoll Education Centers, or to Male’, to seek admission in 
several of the privately-run schools.  
This disparity was even evident in Maldives’ healthcare system. Most islands had 
community health workers who ran the medical outposts. These outposts only provided 
basic medical care. Serious medical conditions were referred to the atoll health centers or, 
where they were available, to the regional hospitals. Medical procedures such as infant 
delivery and neonatal care were predominantly overseen by local midwives (foolhuma). 
The local health centers and hospitals were staffed and managed by a mix of expatriate 
and local doctors and nurses and the facilities lacked modern diagnostic and surgical 
equipment. Even minor things such as x-rays required a trip to the government-run 
hospital in Male’, in part because the regional hospitals rarely had resident specialists. 
This marked disparity in the quality and availability of medical treatment still remains 
today, and is evident in the dispersal of doctors and nursing staff across the country. 
Male’ has over 219 doctors and over 660 nursing staff, while the rest of the Maldives, 
combined, has only 306 doctors and 1,208 nursing staff.94  
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The resultant centripetal force created by such developmental disparity created a 
massive influx of migration from the atolls to Male’ as people flocked to the capital in 
order to obtain better education, healthcare, and employment. Male’, an island which size 
is barely two square Miles, now houses more than 14,000 households, with the mean 
number of persons per household at 7.4.  This means that more than a third of the 
population of Maldives is living in Male.95 The influx of such a large migrant population, 
in addition to the expatriate labor force engaged in various social, economic, and 
commercial activities in Male’, has led to excessive land prices. Many households are 
forced to live in cramped conditions, many with the parents and children all living, 
cooking, eating, and studying in a single room. The households themselves are often 
comprised of two or three nuclear families living together, which allows the families to 
pool their resources. It is common for those migrating from the atolls to leave the elders 
on their island, most often because the elder folk detested the idea of being uprooted from 
familiar surroundings. In other cases, it was a straightforward economic choice; one more 
family member meant being forced to find a larger living space and, thus, having to 
spend more money. 
Apart from massive internal migration, there are other dynamics that come into 
play and which are equally important in understanding the context in which 
modernization has taken place in Maldives. Several factors account for the changes, but 
chief among them is the introduction of English medium schools and widespread 
education, along with the advent of tourism in the 1970s; these can be regarded as the 
biggest drivers of social change in Maldives and the face of modernity, which is most 
visible to those living in Maldives.  
The traditional system of education in Maldives had been rudimentary, at best, 
and was confined to learning how to read the Quran and how to perform the basic rituals 
of Islamic worship. The children, from an early age, were taught the basics of Arabic to 
prepare them for these studies. Armed with wooden boards and charcoal or trays filled 
with sand, the children flocked around the elders in the household or in the neighborhood 
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to learn these lessons by rote. The time between the dusk prayers and the night prayers 
was especially important because the children were made to sit and recite chapters from 
the Quran, such as “al-Mulk” and “al-Yasin.”   
Well before reaching puberty, young children of about seven or eight years 
accompanied their parents and elder family members to the mosques to participate in 
prayers. Learning the litanies and supplications used in prayer were given great 
importance and young children often sat for hours on end reading from a small book 
containing such prayers. These prayers were to be committed to heart, and the young 
children were often quizzed by their elders to ensure that they were memorizing their 
prayers. It didn’t matter that very few people, if none any, understood the meaning 
behind these Arabic supplications; what mattered was learning memorizing them and 
mumbling them in prayers. Children were also encouraged to fast during Ramadan in 
order to prepare them for the time when this act would become obligatory. 
Except for the required Islamic education, the other skills and training that 
children were required to learn centered around completing daily household chores and 
tasks associated with traditional occupations like fishing, toddy tapping, blacksmithing, 
practicing traditional medicine, boating, or the sundry other such occupations whose 
education requirements consisted of on-the-job training. Children started practicing the 
skills they would need one day from a very young age, most often through play and 
watching the adults at work. There were no castes or classes associated with a particular 
occupation, and young children and teenagers, especially boys, learned a range of skills 
necessary to prepare them for almost any eventuality. Apart from these basic skill sets, 
some children trained in subjects such as astronomy, navigation, and basic mathematics, 
which was necessary to prepare them for life as ocean-going traders and travelers.96 The 
girls, apart from getting trained in all the domestic tasks, also learned skills such as 
weaving, coir-rope making, and how to harvest the reef for cowries and other shells. 
They also got training in specialized occupations such as midwifery.  
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Young boys and girls alike got the opportunity to learn skills such as medicine, 
and even the more sinister fandita. The skills children learned and to what degree were 
determined not by a rigid system, but instead, these decisions were based on the interests 
of the children and the availability of credible instructors, especially those practicing 
refined skills such as jewelry making, lacquer work, traditional medicine, boat building, 
and fandita. 
Apart from the basic education and training imparted upon the youngsters from 
within the community, a small number of government-sponsored schools were also 
engaged in teaching subjects like Dhivehi, Arabic, and arithmetic. Additionally, 
individuals from well-to-do families traveled to places like Lucknow, Hyderabad, and 
Cairo to learn Urdu, Arabic, and Islamic studies. That being said, such individuals, and 
instances, were very rare and the majority of Maldivians had to make do with what was 
available to them at their island or atoll level. The traditional education system in 
Maldives served two main purposes: First, as stated by Maloney, it “…served to transmit 
the Great Tradition of Islam and to integrate the island into the Islamic civilizational 
system.”97 Second, it was intended to instill, develop and hone the practical skills that 
were crucial to ensuring survival on the island.  
But it was the onset of modernity, with the introduction of English medium 
education and the advent of tourism, that challenged this traditional system of education 
and also created insurmountable problems for the age-old customs and traditions which 
had been the mainstay of Maldivian society since the beginning. In the 1960s, the 
government introduced English medium education in the Maldives, most notably in 
Male’. Staffed mostly by Sri Lankan teachers, these new schools taught subjects like 
economics, mathematics, English literature, geography, and other subjects that one might 
find in British curriculums.98 The government also established Montessori schools where 
Maldivian children were taught more many of the same subjects apart from nursery 
rhymes, folktales, and other such decidedly ‘Western’ lessons. 
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At present, there are more than 375 primary, secondary, and senior secondary 
schools in Maldives with a student population of over 87,600 students, all of which teach 
in the English medium.99 The curriculums at these schools are a mix of local and British 
models. Dhivehi, the local language, and Islamic studies (including study of the Quran up 
until grade 5) are mandatory subjects. Students take local general exams at the end of 
tenth grade, but all other examinations, both at the higher secondary level (grade 12) and 
senior secondary levels (grade 10) follow the Cambridge examinations. 
The introduction and development of modern, western-oriented education, which 
had insignificant and inadequate focus on the customs and traditions of the society, meant 
a steady erosion of Maldivian social institutions and customs. Education and upbringing, 
which had hitherto been a multifaceted process producing young individuals who were 
totally indoctrinated into the social system and who had the necessary skills to prosper in 
Maldivian life, was replaced by a system which was faulty at best and which allowed a 
greater level of delinquency. This is also due in part to the fact that many of the 
government-run schools have huge student populations and are inadequately staffed and 
poorly managed, especially in the atolls. Additionally, the current mode of education 
overemphasizes rote learning and spends less time focusing on moral and civil values and 
character building.100  
Additionally, employment and higher education prospects, under the new 
education system, are decided by students’ performance on general exams taken at the 
end of their schooling (after completing grade 10). Those who pass with good results can 
join higher education institutions or pursue education abroad, while those whose 
performance was mediocre, of which there is a huge number, have little favorable 
prospects.101 Youth unemployment and economic inactivity is a serious concern in 
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Maldives, especially in Male’. The unemployment rate for the census age groups 20–24, 
25–29, and 30–34 are 34.1, 27.1 and 23.3, respectively.102  
Such high unemployment rates occur due to the unavailability of suitable jobs, 
especially for those who have had some form of formal education. They are reluctant to 
join the workforce as low-paid labor because the wages are set too low due to the 
presence of a large expatriate labor force that are willing to work for far less than the 
locals. The legal expatriate workforce, mostly consisting of individuals from Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, India, and, lately, Nepal, are employed in areas such as construction, 
agriculture, and as domestic help all across Maldives. The legally registered expatriate 
workforce has more than quadrupled in the past 16 years, rising dramatically from 13,834 
in 1994 to 33,765 in 2003 and 73,840 in 2010.103 
One of the positive aspects of nationwide modern education is that Maldivian 
students are now able to pursue higher studies, at the undergraduate and graduate levels 
at regional and international universities. Between 2000 and 2010, Maldivian students 
obtained more than 600 undergraduate degrees, 150 masters’ degrees, and 15 PhD 
degrees from various international universities.104 The negative aspect of this increased 
foreign education is that it exacerbates the clash between Maldivian traditional norms and 
new Western ideals and lifestyles.105 The foreign educated youth tend to be more liberal, 
open, and outspoken when compared to the more conservative and stoic elder 
generations.  
Tourism, which is the other major driving force of modernization and the spread 
of Western ideals in Maldives, equally challenges traditional norms and customs. 
Tourism was introduced in Maldives in the 1970s with the establishment of the first 
                                                 
102Department of National Planning. “Population 15 Years and Over by Type of Activity, Cross-
Classified by Region, HIES, 2009, 2010,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
103 “Expatriate Employment 1994–2003,” Ministry of Planning and National Development, 
http://www.planning.gov.mv/publications/25yearsstats/graphs/3.htm, accessed November 18, 2011, and 
Department of National Planning. “Expatriate Employment by Industry and Nationality, 2010,” Statistical 
Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
104 Department of National Planning “Students Who Received Scholarships During 2000–2010,” 
Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
105 Parmanand, “Winds of Change: Fresh Stirrings in the Maldives,” in Verinder Grover, Ed. 
Maldives: Government and Politics (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2000), 130. 
 44
tourist resorts and, while the initial days included many misguided policies such as 
allowing nudism on some islands and unfettered access to the local population, the 
government has largely managed to institute effective control measures in such a way 
that it fosters the nascent industry while minimizing the negative effects it can have on 
the local society. Many Maldivians, including former President Qayoom and conservative 
groups within the society, had certain reservations about the adverse results which might 
come about due to the unsupervised and unguided introduction of tourism106 and, thus, 
policies were put in place to protect the Maldivian locals.  
The unique geography of Maldives allowed investors to set up resorts on small 
islands that were removed from inhabited islands. This gave tourists the high-end 
exclusivity, freedom, and independence for which Maldives is renowned, without local 
customs getting in their way. This also allowed the government and hoteliers to get 
around local laws such as prohibiting the sale of alcohol and pork on inhabited islands. If 
the tourists wished to see local sights and sounds, they could visit the inhabited islands 
and the capital island by taking ferries owned by the state, or they could stay in the guest 
houses on Male’. They also could travel around Maldives in safari cruises which stopped 
at various local islands. These policies allowed the local population to tap into the 
economic opportunities created by the new industry while preventing local customs and 
traditions from getting totally subsumed under the wave of new cultural influences.  
Such policies were crucial to preserving the fragile balance between developing 
the tourism industry and protecting local customs and traditions, especially during the 
initial period of time when tourism first came to Maldives. Nevertheless, with the 
expansion and diversification of the industry, the fragile balance was greatly disturbed. 
As the industry expanded, it required an ever-increasing local workforce to fill posts 
ranging from room-boys to jobs at the top management level. The workforce was usually 
recruited from nearby islands and, very often, the workers resided on the resort islands (in 
quarters away from those of the patrons of the resort). The predominantly male 
workforce, thus, became unavailable for their traditional occupations in their local 
communities because the resorts offered more lucrative reward packages. They were also 
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absent from their families for a longer time, which meant that the old system of training, 
educating, and grooming, under which young adults were gradually led to maturity, was 
replaced by an inadequate system. The overall expansion of the tourism industry created 
avenues for those aspiring for careers in areas such as management, culinary arts, 
hospitality, front office management, operation of travel agencies, and other such areas, 
which attracted female and male workers alike.  
Such drastic changes in the demographic pattern and lifestyle within Maldivian 
society tore apart the age-old family and community systems. Families and close-knit 
communities had always provided a social safety net for one another, and communities 
had provided for their own on the island, which very often contained extended families 
related to each other through blood and marriage. When people began to migrate off the 
islands in search of better employment and education, the system began to fall apart. 
While they managed to obtain relatively better education and public services, the quality 
of life suffered badly. As a result, these families have had to face several social malaises 
due to the squalid living conditions, including issues like drug abuse, gang violence, and 
warfare which have become common in the Maldives. Such problems, which are very 
often the by-products of a society that has become disjointed, are issues that all 
Maldivians are grappling with. 
Drug abuse is one of the most pressing concerns in the Maldivian society, and is 
reported to have increased more than 40-fold between 1977 and 1995.107 The typical 
abuser is very often a male dropout between the ages of 16 and 25, often unemployed, 
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Unfortunately, drug abuse and gang violence often go hand-in-hand. Gang warfare in 
Maldives often reaches a crisis situation in Male, with turf wars and inter-gang rivalries 
sometimes leading to deaths by stabbing.109  
Adverse economic conditions, increasingly powerful and unabated waves of 
Western ideals, and dramatic increases in social issues have all converged to create an 
environment which facilitates feelings of marginalization and alienation. Not only has the 
social system been torn apart, but the new and foreign influences have challenged the 
very core of national identity and national consciousness. This uneasiness was felt even at 
the very top political level and it was decided that the Maldivian identity had to be 
resurrected and given a primary position in the culture. Top officials realized that the 
cultural and religious unity of Maldives had to be preserved and strengthened if Maldives 
was to withstand the vicissitudes that were coming their way due to increased 
international exposure.110 In this context, Islam was an integral part of the Maldivian 
national identity and national ethos and officials noted that Islam needed to be 
strengthened and revived for it to become the most formidable bulwark of the Maldivian 
national identity. 
The presidency of Qayoom, as outlined in Chapter III, saw a period of Islamic 
rejuvenation sweeping across Maldives. Romero-Frias, who conducted an 
anthropological survey of Maldives during the 1990s, was critical of the extent of 
‘Arabization’ that was involved with the policies of Islamic revivalism and the adverse 
effects it had on the local traditions and customs, which had previously been more open 
and tolerant. The increasing number of veiled women and bearded men, the growing 
disdain for indigenous forms of dress and autochthonous culture and language, and the 
more conservative and less tolerant slant of the society, were all troubling aspects of this 
trend for Romero-Frias. He predicted that non-conformist youth who had no inkling of 
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their country’s rich culture and traditions would fight against the constant push for the 
adoption of the Arab norms.111  
C. RISE OF ISLAMIC CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS 
The resulting friction between the competing value systems, increasingly pro-
Western on one hand and increasingly conservative on the other, heightened the feeling 
of alienation for many Maldivians. This situation in Maldives is similar to numerous 
other Islamic states and societies. High unemployment, inadequate and unbalanced 
economic development, an influx of Western ideals and norms which militate against 
traditional norms and taboos, and social ills such as drug abuse are all present within the 
Maldivian society. 
Under these conditions, Islamic social and civic organizations have been able to 
greatly infiltrate and establish their roots. In 2009, Jamiat-ul-Salaf and the Islamic 
Foundation of Maldives (IFM) were established. Both of these groups are non-violent 
and mainstream social movements that push their agenda of social reformation through 
Islam.112  
Until very recently, Maldives had a dearth of learned Islamic scholars, but the 
transmission of religious messages, missives, and other such communication was greatly 
hindered by the geography of the island. The various religious functionaries who had 
operated at the island level, including the Qazis, island headmen, and the Imams 
(mudhimu) of the mosques had very limited knowledge about religious matters, 
especially those relating to spiritual, philosophical, and social aspects of Islam. There was 
limited knowledge about other religious sects, or about the vastness of the Islamist 
thought. Instead, these local religious leaders focused more on the orthopraxy of religion 
and the transmission of the various litanies and rituals.113 
Organized religious groups, of which there had been very few, had been an oddity 
in Maldives. One reason for this might be that in the highly-charged political atmosphere 
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of pre-democratic Maldives, any organization that had an organizational structure and 
followers would be viewed as a potential threat to the regime in power. That is not to say 
that Maldives did not tap into the various Islamic movements that were sweeping across 
the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent during the 1920s and 1930s, but the presence 
and ideology of these movements might have been restricted to some remote islands. 
During the presidency of Qayoom, international, non-governmental organizations and 
religious institutions, such as Raabitah al-Alam Islami, operated in the Maldives.  
Quran classes (madrassas), which took over the traditional role that was 
previously filled by the Edhuruge, also played an important part in the socio-religious 
sphere of the country. These institutions, of which there were many, can rightly be said to 
be the precursors to the modern day Islamic social organizations such as Jamiyatul Salaf 
and IFM. These Quran classes often employed young teachers and scholars, as well as 
senior students from the two Arabic education institutions. The lessons included Quran 
recitation practice, lessons in prayer, and observance of religious practices. The various 
Quran classes, like Masjid al-Falaah and Noorul-Quran, organized Quran recitation 
competitions and prepared students for the national Quran competitions. More 
importantly, they provided a venue and an organization under which people could come 
together and forward the cause of Islam and, as such, they were one of the most enduring 
entities within the Maldivian society 
Contrasting that with the present situation presents a starkly different image. 
Religious scholars who have been trained in various places such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Pakistan, and Malaysia are numerous in the Maldives. More importantly, they face little 
restrictions in propagating their message and lecturing to the general public, as opposed 
to during Qayoom’s rule. Their mission to reach those at the grass-root levels has been 
further aided by the availability of cable TV, radio stations, and the Internet.  
Both IFM and Jamiyathul Salaf are comprised of learned scholars as well as 
grass-roots activists. Both these organizations follow the Wahhabi slant in ideology and 
the scholars of these organizations portray a decidedly Arabic persona, with the adoption 
of Arabic forms of names (containing terms such as bin and abu, followed by the name of 
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the male parent or progeny, respectively) and a quixotic mix of Arabian/Pakistani and 
Afghani dress, which stands in sharp contrast to the normal naming practices and dress 
styles in Maldives. 
These organizations, most notably, Salaf, have started various social outreach 
programs, such as religious lectures by renowned scholars, youth religious education 
camps (modeled after the Prophetic ‘hijra’),114 and prayer and Quran sessions for men 
and women. These organizations hold special lectures, host TV shows, and publish their 
own periodicals and websites to further their message about issues ranging from how to 
pray properly to the role of women in Islam. These organizations also invite prominent 
Islamic scholars such as Dr. Bilal Philips to lecture to an ever-increasing audience about 
social issues and how to better abide by Islamic dictums. Additionally, IFM has started 
reaching out to the significant Maldivian emigrant and student communities living in Sri 
Lanka and India, as well as Malaysia.115 These organizations are operating in an 
environment that is ripe for their infiltration. In the messy milieu of Maldivian society, 
these organizations have found very loyal supporters. Events such as lectures and talk 
shows are filled to capacity. These organizations also use the Internet and mass media to 
forward their messages. Each organization maintains an online presence. The lecture 
series and other religious sermons are readily available for sale and they introduce 
Maldivians to new Islamic thought and worldviews.  
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V. REGIONAL RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS AND MALDIVES 
A. LINKAGES BETWEEN MALDIVES AND REGIONAL RADICAL 
ENTITIES 
Maldivian ties with regional terrorist organizations first came under international 
scrutiny when a Maldivian, Ibrahim Fauzee, was arrested in Pakistan by U.S. forces for 
his alleged ties with al-Qaeda. In the Summary of Evidence memo that was drawn against 
Fauzee, it was stated that he was arrested while residing at a suspected al-Qaeda hideout 
in Pakistan. The memo also stated that Fauzee’s point of contact telephone number was 
found in the possession of other terrorist detainees and that his telephone number was 
associated with that of a Sudanese teacher who was engaged in assisting Arabs with 
travel to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.116 But, following his Combatant Status 
Review, Fauzee was cleared of all terrorist ties and was declared as a “No Longer Enemy 
Combatant” in 2004. He was released in 2005. While Fauzee was released and cleared of 
all allegations,117 the ties between regional terrorist organizations and Maldives still 
seemed very credible.  
Maldivians have been seeking ideological and operational inspiration from 
regional radical entities as far back as the 1990s. More than a dozen youth, who had 
attended an educational institution in Pakistan operated by Jamiyah al-Salafiyya, had 
been indoctrinated against the government of Qayoom. They entertained and expressed 
sentiments of anti-government coups and the desire to institute a theocratic sharia-based 
state in Maldives. The discovery of such anti-government feelings among Maldivian 
students studying in Pakistan prompted the government to dispatch the former Chief 
Justice, al-Ustad Mohamed Rasheed Ibrahim, an Egyptian trained cleric and scholar, to 
inquire about the grievances of the students and also to caution the Pakistani institution 
about the dangerous path some of their students were treading. Yet, despite these 
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measures, upon their return, some of the students were arrested and banished to remote 
islands, where they continued to preach their messages.118 
The Maldivian youth who attended Islamic educational institutions in Pakistan 
were not only engaged in getting an Islamic education. The late 1980s was the heyday of 
the Afghani war against the Soviets and many Maldivian youth who were studying in 
seminaries across Pakistan traveled to various jihadi training camps in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border area.119 
B. RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES 
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami proved to be a great blessing for the regional 
terrorist organizations that were seeking to gain footholds in Maldives. Like most 
countries in the Indian Ocean region, Maldives suffered great devastations, with almost 
entire islands being submerged and swept away. In the aftermath of the tsunami, charity 
organization that were fronts for regional terrorist groups arrived and began dispensing 
humanitarian aid and financial assistance among the affected populations. Ideological 
guidance through publications and other sources was also part of what these groups were 
providing for the disaster-struck populace. In some instances, these charities assisted in 
enrolling youth in religious seminaries (madrassas) in Pakistan, while in other cases, the 
youth were recruited for a more sinister purpose. 
One of the hardest hit regions in Maldives was the Laamu atoll (towards the 
Southern tip of Maldives). There, the entire population of two islands, Kalhaidoo and 
Mundoo, were relocated to temporary housing and shelters in decommissioned garment 
factories in the industrial area of the largest island in the atoll, Gan. The population of 
Kalhaidhoo had experienced a religious awakening in the 1980s under the tutelage of 
Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim (who is referred to as the ‘Big Sheikh’ in a jihadi propaganda 
video released following the encounter between security forces and radicals in AA. 
Himandhoo).  
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Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim obtained his Islamic education from Pakistan and, upon 
his return to Maldives, he began to protest against the religious views propagated by 
Qayoom’s regime. He was banished to L. Kalhaidoo, where he continued to preach about 
Islam and press for greater modesty in dressing, in accordance with the Islamic teachings. 
His religious teachings also took on a more anti-government slant, especially when he 
began to declare that the government had built the mosques from earnings that were 
“haraam” and thus, it was not permissible to pray in them. Segregated prayer groups 
began to crop up as people shunned the government-built mosques.120 
Following the tsunami and ensuing relocation, a group of four men from Male’ 
visited the temporary housing camps. They claimed to be representing a UK-based 
person of Asian origins known only as “Abu Issa,” who was believed to be a financier for 
various terrorist outfits operating in parts of Pakistan.121 Among those distributing the aid 
on behalf of this mysterious financier was Moosa Inas, who would later be one of the 
perpetrators of the Sultan Park bomb incident of 2007, which injured more than twelve 
foreign tourists. Inas, along with his accomplices, made it clear to the unfortunate 
islanders that the money they had at their disposal would only be spent on those who 
agreed to join them in furthering their ideology.122 
In addition to this particular group, charity fronts such as Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq 
(IKK) are especially significant. The IKK has been linked with the Ahl-e-Hadith sects 
operating in the region, and they established their roots in Maldives as well. The IKK is 
affiliated with Jamaat-u-Dawa (which is engaged in Tabligh, i.e., active proselytizing) 
and the more sinister Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Pakistani-based terrorist groups 
responsible for numerous attacks in India, Pakistan, and other areas across the region.123 
The links between the Islamic “charity” organizations and active proselytizing is 
evident in the changing Islamic rhetoric and practices that are spreading within Maldivian 
society. While there has been a resurgence of Islamic conservatism in Maldives, the 
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newer rhetoric, most often associated with the Ahl-e-Hadith (literally, followers of the 
Prophetic Traditions) groups and the Salafists, stands in sharp contrast to even that of the 
conservatives. The Salafists, mostly associated with Wahhabism, draw a political reading 
from the Quran and Islamic traditions. They aspire to emulate the Prophet and his 
righteous followers, and as such, they do not make any accommodations for groups of 
different views. One of the most dominant features of this ideology is the veneration of 
jihad and the practice of Takfirism (branding other Muslims of weaker faith as 
Apostates). The proponents of this ideology operating in some parts of Maldives have 
even issued death sentences against locals who fail to support them.124 
In Maldives, this new rhetoric was adopted by numerous groups and individuals, 
who are dubbed locally as the “Super Salaf.” Such groups declare the government of 
Maldives, especially the last regime, to be Taghut (someone who is a Muslim only in 
name) and they claim that the religious scholars of Maldives, especially those heading the 
Adaalath Party, are “Murjia.”125 They adopt what is essentially a skewed worldview of 
the perpetual conflict between believers and non-believers, one in which Islam is 
continuously waging a holy war against the “infidel forces” of the pro-Western regimes 
and the West itself.  
Their main ideologues include the likes of Ibn-Taimiyyah, the 13th century 
Islamic scholar who condemned the moral corruption of the Abbasid Caliphate, and 
Abdulla Youssef Azzam, the leading ideologue of the Afghan Mujahedin and bin 
Laden’s first mentor.126 These individuals refrain from praying in mosques built by the 
government, which according to them, have been tainted because the government is 
involved in un-Islamic activities such as tourism and the funds used to build the mosques 
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are derived from selling pork and alcohol, and allowing hedonistic activities that are 
totally inappropriate in a 100% Muslim state, and which are prohibited by Islam.127  
The opening salvo of the Islamist threat in Maldives was the Sultan Park 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incident of 2007. The ensuing investigations led the 
government authorities to the remote island of AA. Himandhoo, where the security forces 
clashed with hardline Islamic radicals defending Masjid-al-Khair, a makeshift mosque in 
which the radicals conducted their prayers, which was created after they shunned the 
main mosque on the island.128 In the aftermath of this clash, a video release was made, 
allegedly by al-Qaeda affiliates, calling for support for the oppressed Muslim brethren in 
the Maldives.129 
Another aspect of the regional terrorist organizations is that, through their 
constant recruitment operations, they entice Maldivian youth to participate in jihadi 
operations to, ultimately, attain martyrdom. Since 2003, many Maldivian youth have 
been apprehended while trying to travel to training camps in Pakistan. After having been 
educated in various skills and tactics and pumped up with their ideological vitriol, these 
youth get shipped off to fight in jihadi operations. In an interview given to CNN-IBN in 
2009, President Nasheed stated that thousands of Maldivian youth were being recruited to 
study at various religious madrassas or to join jihadi operations in Pakistan and that this 
presented a fundamental threat to the security of Maldives.130 
In 2009, an al-Qaeda propaganda video included a Maldivian by the name of Ali 
Jaleel. The video was filmed before he participated in a martyrdom attack conducted 
against a security force installation in Pakistan.131 Similarly, in 2010, nine armed 
Maldivians were arrested in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan. These individuals 
allegedly had ties with the first radical-Islam inspired terrorist attack in the Maldives and 
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they had fled to Pakistan, possibly to evade arrest or to gain further training. There have 
also been Indian intelligence reports linking Maldivians to the 2009 Mumbai attacks.132 
“Returnees” from jihadi operations bring back with them their skills, ideologies, 
and the desire to pursue politico-religious ends through violent means. Unfortunately, this 
means that Maldives faces similar threats. Infused as they are with the ideology of 
waging jihad and equipped with the necessary skill sets, those returning to Maldives turn 
to violent agitation. For them, political action is secondary to jihad and they have little 
patience for grass-root level transformations of the society or for the polemics of the 
political process, especially in an environment where the only hardline Islamist party is 
being forced to play coalition politics. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The rise of Islamism and Islamic radicalism in Maldives is facilitated by a 
malevolent mix of factors which are intricately linked together. Extreme political 
repression, intense clashes between traditional norms and cultural values, recently 
introduced western norms due to modernization, and an influx of radical ideology have 
all aided in the creation of an atmosphere that has led to the rise of Islamism and Islamic 
radicalism. And it is this new environment that has proved to be very conducive to 
breeding a crop of young Maldivians who yearn to participate in jihadi operations in 
conflict areas like Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
 A highly exclusive political system characterized by a small number of political 
players, the absence of political parties, and the use of excessively brutal repressive 
measures to stamp out any form of dissent has been a constant feature of Maldivian 
politics. Conspiratorial challenges, coups, and internal squabbles over the Maldivian 
throne had been endemic within the cliques of Maldivian political elites since the time of 
the Sultanate. Unfortunately, little had changed in the nature of governance and political 
administration even when Maldives became a republic. The same authoritarian structures 
were maintained and politics was still regarded as the domain of a highly exclusive and 
privileged coterie.  
Additionally, the regimes that followed the Sultanate also used harsh repressive 
measures to keep a check on political dissent, often resorting to brutal torture and 
banishments. The use of religious authority during the regime of Qayoom to cement his 
hold on power, coupled with repression, produced a convergence of interest between the 
political opposition and the religiously conservative elements of the society. It also paved 
a way for the emergence of a political discourse that was decidedly religious and forced 
legitimate political and religious voices to go underground and to establish conspiratorial 
and secretive networks with which to further their agendas. Such manipulations of 
religion and the government sponsorship of a single strand of “moderate” Islam incensed 
the more conservative groups, who declared the regime and its ruler to be Thaghut. Anti-
government plots and designs to overthrow the regime of Qayoom circulated amongst 
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foreign-educated Islamic clerics and students studying abroad, who were influenced by 
the conservative ideologies they were being introduced to in other countries. An example 
of these violent expressions of anti-government sentiments can be seen in the clashes at 
AA. Himandhoo. 
There is a great dichotomy within Maldivian society as these increasingly 
conservative elements clash with the modern and western norms which have started 
entering the country as a result of the introduction of tourism, mass education, and the 
ever-increasing contact with the outside world. For most of history, the traditional 
Maldivian society had been essentially closed to the outside world, with life restricted to 
the monotony of repetitive tasks within small island communities. The cultural 
marginality and strong ethos of Islam enabled the traditional societies of Maldives to 
inoculate themselves against outside influences that would have upset the communal 
balance and rhythm of life. But, in recent years, Maldives has gone from a society bound 
in traditions and taboos to being rapidly catapulted into becoming a society that is open to 
unfettered influence and influx of outside norms and values.  
Despite their undeniably positive aspects, the introduction of tourism, western 
education, and increased contact with the outside world greatly eroded the social taboos 
and norms, upset the social fabric, and fundamentally altered Maldivian society.  This 
change, which took place within the short span of almost 40 years, rapidly transformed 
the tone and character of Maldives and introduced alien concepts, values, and norms.  
The onset of modernity also created massive social and economic challenges, 
such as economic disparity, unemployment, and an increase in crime rates and drug 
abuse. All these factors converged together to create a sense of alienation and 
disillusionment amongst the population. The old social ties and structures, which had 
provided social lubrication and acted as a safety net, were torn apart.  
  The present Maldivian society is one caught between two extremes: on one hand, 
there is the increasing rise of Islamic conservatism and rigid orthodoxy, and on the other, 
there is an ever-increasing Western influence and a drive towards modernization. History 
reveals that since conversion to Islam, there have been several waves of Islamic 
orthodoxy and puritanical rigidity in Maldives. Some of these waves were initiated by the 
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Sultans, who functioned as the ultimate guardian of the faith, which was seen by locals as 
a pre-occupation of the elites in Male’. Other such waves were initiated by visiting 
Islamic clerics or locals who had traveled abroad and received education in and exposure 
to Islamic practices and traditions in places like India and the Arab world. In any case, 
such waves of enforced religious orthodoxy and rigidity slowly led to the decline of 
autochthonous customs and traditions of the pre-Islamic, jahiliyya past. With the push 
towards Islamic orthodoxy, these autochthonous traditions were replaced with a social 
structure, an order, and a social climate that was predominantly Islamic, but one in which 
there were still strong remnants of the old syncretic religious and cultural practices.  
Recently, the syncretic religious traditions and lax attitudes towards religious 
practices have been changing rapidly, greatly aided by the presence of social Islamic 
organizations, and their use of mass media and abundant resources. The level of 
religiosity is increasing; old traditions and customs are being dismissed as being bid’ah 
(inventions contrary to the teachings of Islam) and certain segments of the society are 
growing intensely conservative. Evidence of this is given by the fact that issues such as 
female genital mutilation (FGM) and Islamic faith healing (Ruqya) are being advocated 
by the Islamist organizations.133 
The introduction of democratic governance, the grant of freedom of speech, and 
the right to operate political parties and social organizations proved to be a tremendous 
windfall for the Islamists. While the sole Islamic political party, the Adaalath Party, have 
not been able to generate significant electoral support, Islamic social organizations such 
as Jamiyathul-Salaf (JS) and the Islamic Foundation of Maldives (IFM) are making 
tremendous headway in establishing groups all across the country. Entities like JS have 
taken on the responsibility of religious policing and have issued complaints and missives 
against what they deem to be un-Islamic behavior and morality. Through their use of the 
Internet, radio, television talk shows and religious programs, public lectures, sermons, 
and various workshops conducted across Maldives and, in some cases, within Maldivian 
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communities living abroad, these Islamic organizations are creating the social conditions 
and climate necessary to usher in political transformation. 
While such mainstream Islamic organizations are engaged in legitimate social and 
civic work, there also exist networks and structures that are engaged in generating more 
radical discourse. These networks are closely tied to regional terrorist organizations, from 
which they obtain material support and indoctrination. These networks greatly benefit 
from the mainstream conservative religious discourse because it creates a society which 
is more favorable to their radical propaganda and ideology. These networks capitalize on 
the deep-seeded disenchantment and alienation felt within Maldivian society, especially 
among the youth. These youth are gradually indoctrinated into the radical ideology, and 
recruited to join in jihadi operations. They also receive additional indoctrination, apart 
from the requisite trainings necessary to plan and carry-out terror attacks. Some of these 
youth return to Maldives, where they recruit new generations to perpetuate their terrorist 
organizations. 
  The present Maldivian society, as was outlined above, is highly schizophrenic. 
Maldives officially claims to be 100% Muslim, yet, in a throwback to older times, some 
Maldivians have begun to militate against the increasingly stifling and rigid orthodoxy 
and the excessive Arabian influences that are advocated by the newly-educated religious 
scholars and clerics. Part of this rejection stems from the lingering remnants of a 
syncretic religious past and part of it is due to Western influences and norms. In the 
messy milieu of Maldivian society, discerning the difference is almost impossible; yet, 
more strident than these elements are those that are pushing the society towards a more 
conservative and orthodox religious discourse. The social and political agendas of these 
groups are directed towards creating the necessary conditions to rid the society of all the 
evils and vices of the traditional culture, as well as the western influences, and establish 
an Islamic state based on Sharia law. 
 How the Maldivian government and society deal with these fundamentally 
antagonistic outlooks and how they combat the growing tide of religious radicalism will 
decide the fate of the state and its people. The turn towards democracy has provided a 
favorable climate to approach the issue of Islamic radicalism. Unlike the regime of his 
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predecessor, President Nasheed’s government has managed to move religion away from 
politics.  The Minister of Islamic Affairs is entrusted with crafting and implementing the 
religious policies of the state and the President, though constitutionally mandated to 
uphold the Islamic faith and its tenets has repeatedly stated that he will defer all issues 
concerning religion to those trained in such matters. 
At present, it can be argued that the government has adopted a relatively lax 
attitude towards the radical elements. The radicalized youth that returned to Maldives 
after being apprehended for alleged terrorist links are put through what is best described 
as a “revolving door policy.” Even the perpetrators of the Sultan Park bombing incident 
have been granted clemency and have been pardoned by the government.134 The Islamic 
ministry is involved in de-radicalization programs in sensitive communities like AA. 
Himandhoo, but, by their own accounts, these programs have largely failed to have any 
positive impact. 
 A significant burden of de-radicalization has to be borne by the Islamic clerics 
and scholars. At present, they remain a much divided group. There is a high degree of 
doctrinal differences between them, and this has prevented them from putting up a 
unified front to deal with the radicalizing elements. Part of the split is based on the 
divergence of political interest and ideology, between the establishment ulema and the 
others. There is also great division among the scholars based on the institution and 
country from which they received their education and training. Factors such as internal 
squabbles, political opportunism, and doctrinal differences have largely rendered these 
religious leaders incapable of providing effective guidance to Maldivian society. 
 The level of religious conservatism has undoubtedly increased. Along with it, the 
culture, social norms, and traditions of Maldives are also changing. Around twenty years 
ago, women only past fifty years of age would wear the burga and Maldivians would 
only contemplate going on their religious pilgrimage after they had grown old. This 
situation is much different today when girls as young as nine are increasingly wearing the 
burqa and more and more young people are going on the pilgrimage. Differences as 
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insignificant as these suggest that fundamental changes have taken place within 
Maldivian society. 
 The challenge for Maldives is to accommodate these differences while combating 
the more malicious transformations that have come about in the wake of these changes. 
Growing Islamic radicalism and expressions of militancy are a threat to the tourism 
industry of Maldives, which is the economic mainstay of Maldives. Incidents like the 
Sultan Park bombing can greatly upset the Maldivian economy and destroy global and 
regional confidence in Maldives as a credible player in international affairs. 
 Government efforts, at this juncture, have to be aimed at identifying and 
dismantling the structures and organizations that are engaged in spreading the radical 
ideology. It also has to undertake a serious reappraisal of its approach towards dealing 
with “potential jihadis,” as well as apprehended terrorists. These individuals should not 
be allowed to move freely about in society and spread their virulent message. 
Additionally, international and regional counter terrorism and counter radicalism efforts 
have to be strengthened. Radical elements operating in Maldives have significant ties to 
the regional terrorist groups. Such ties should be investigated in collaboration with 
regional intelligence agencies and followed up diligently. 
 Closely tied to these efforts is creating public awareness and increasing 
knowledge about the teachings of Islam. A large part of this endeavor is currently being 
fulfilled by various NGOs, such as JS and IFM. The government’s role, in such instances, 
has to be aimed at analyzing the message and its impact on society. Speakers of dubious 
standing or little credibility should not be allowed to preach either in public or in private. 
This is an onerous task and one that requires balancing the democratic norm of free 
speech with prudent policy. The negative aspect of such efforts is that the government 
can be accused of being excessively censorial and dictatorial in matters of religion. 
Therefore, this task has to be carried out in a diplomatic manner and through consensus. 
 63
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“Adaalath to Defend Arabiyya School, Islamic School,” Miadhu Daily, April 12, 2010. 
Ahmed, Rizwan A. “The State and National Foundation in the Maldives,” Cultural 
Dynamics 13, 2001: 293–315. 
Anderson, Lisa. “Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism.” In 
Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, edited by John L. Esposito. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1997. 
“Anti-Israel Protestors vow to continue protest against Visiting Israeli Doctors,” Haveeru 
Daily, December 13, 2010. 
Ariyatilaka, B. A. “The Maldives: A Forgotten Buddhist Past,” Sri Lanka National 
Buddhist Authority, 
http://www.nbasrilanka.itgo.com/blank_6.htmlhttp://www.nbasrilanka.itgo.com/b
lank_6.html, accessed July 20, 2011. 
Ayoob, Mohamed. “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” World Policy Journal, 21, no. 3, 
2004: 1–14. 
———. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. 
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008. 
Barton, Greg. Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia. Singapore: Ridge 
Books, 2005. 
Bell, H. C. P. The Maldive Island - An Account  of the Physical Features, Climate, 
History, Inhabitants, Production and Trade. Ceylon: Acting Government Printer, 
1882. 
Bonofer, Jacob A. “The Challenges of Democracy in the Maldives,” International 
Journal of South Asian Studies, 3, no. 2, 2010: 433–449. 
Brachman, Jarret M. Global Jihadism. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. New York: I. B. Taurus & Co. 
Ltd., 2004. 
Chandrasekharan, S. “Maldives: Runoff to Presidential Elections Turning Dirty,” October 
23, 2008, South Asia Analysis Group, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers29%5Cpaper2891.html, accessed 
March 15, 2011. 
Coelho, V. H. “Constitutional and Political Development in the Maldives,” in Verinder 
Grover, ed. Maldives: Government and Politics. New Delhi: Deep & Deep 
Publication Pvt. Ltd., 2000: 45–65. 
“Co-education Inconsistent with the Culture of Islam says AP,” Minivan News, October 
10, 2010. 
 64
 “Country Health System Profile: Trends in Socioeconomic Development,” World Health 
Organization, http://www.searo.who.int/en/Section313/Section1521_10898.htm, 
accessed November 18, 2011. 
“Country Health System Profile: Trends in Socioeconomic Development,” World Health 
Organization, http://www.searo.who.int/en/Section313/Section1521_10898.htm, 
accessed November 18, 2011. 
“Dawah Islamiyyah@ Colombo 2011,” Islamic Foundation of Maldives Official Website, 
http://www.islamicfoundationofthemaldives.org/, accessed May 30, 2011. 
Dekmejian, Hrair R. Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. Syracuse, 
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995. 
Department of National Planning “Students Who Received Scholarships During 2000–
2010,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
Department of National Planning. “Census Population Information by Sex and Sex-Ratio, 
and Inter-Censal Variation of Population, 1911–2006,” Statistical Year Book: 
Maldives 2011.  
Department of National Planning. “Distribution of Medical Staff in Male’ and Atolls – 
2010,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
Department of National Planning. “Expatriate Employment by Industry and Nationality, 
2010,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
Department of National Planning. “Number of students sat and passed in the O'level 
examination by Atolls, 2008–2010,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
Department of National Planning. “Population 15 Years and Over by Type of Activity, 
Cross-Classified by Region, HIES, 2009, 2010,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 
2011. 
Department of National Planning. “Population by Age and Sex, Census 1995, 2000 and 
2006,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
Department of National Planning. “Population by Island Census, 2000, 2006,” Statistical 
Year Book: Maldives 2011. 
Department of National Planning. “Student Enrolment and Schools in Male’ and Atolls 
by Type of Educational Institution 2010,” Statistical Year Book: Maldives 2011.  
Ellis, Royston. A Man for all Island: A Biography of Maumoon Abdul Qayoom, President 
of the Maldives. Singapore: Times Editions, 1998. 
Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
“Expatriate Employment 1994-2003,” Ministry of Planning and National Development, 
http://www.planning.gov.mv/publications/25yearsstats/graphs/3.htm, accessed 
November 18, 2011. 
“Extremist Groups Issue Death Threats,” Minivan News, February 26, 2007. 
 65
Francois Pyrard de Laval, The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the 
Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, trans. Albert Gray. New York: Burt Franklin. 
http://www.maldivesculture.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id
=184&Itemid=61, accessed October 18, 2011. 
Fuller, Graham E. “The Future of Political Islam.” Foreign Affairs 81:2 (2002): 48–60. 
———. The Future of Political Islam. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. 
Gerges, Fawaz. The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
“Government to allow sale of alcohol on inhabited island,” Minivan News, November 9, 
2009. 
Hafez, Mohammed M. Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Muslim 
World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 
Hassan, Didi N. T. Kureege Huvadhoo Atoll. Male’, Maldives: Novelty Press, 2005.  
Heyerdahl, Thor. The Maldives Mystery. Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler Publishers, 
Inc., 1986. 
“How Steadfast are Maldivians in Islam,” April 22, 2005, 
http://www.maldivesroyalfamily.com/editorial_maldives_islamic_steadfastness.s
html, accessed July 20, 2011. 
Hunter, Shireen T. The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful 
Coexistence? Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. 
Hussain, Mahdi. The Rehla of Ibn Battuta - India, Maldive Islands and Ceylon - 
translation and commentary. Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1976. 
“Islamic Affairs Minister Dumbfounded by Maumoon’s words,” Miadhu Daily, 11 
January 2010, http://www.miadhu.com/2010/01/local-news/islamic-affairs-
minister-dumbfounded-by-maumoon%E2%80%99s-words/, accessed March 3, 
2011. 
“Islamic Ministry to Take Steps Against Congregation Holding Separate Friday Prayers,” 
Haveeru Daily, January 4, 2009. 
Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: Random 
House Inc., 2003. 
“MDP destroying sanctity of Adaalath, claims religious party,” Minivan News, January 
27, 2011. 
“Maldives Drug Control Master Plan 2006-2010,” National Narcotics Control Bureau, 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006, 
http://www.health.gov.mv/PDF/HIV/Drug%20Master%20Plan%202006%20-
%202010%20Maldives.pdf, accessed November 18, 2011. 
 “Maldives,” Chicago Public Schools, Office of Language and Cultural Education, 
http://www.olce.org/pdfs/SOuth%20Asia/Maldives.pdf, accessed July 20, 2011. 
 66
“Maldives: International Religious Freedom Report 2006,” Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State,, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71441.htm, accessed March 3, 2011. 
“Maldivian Mujahedin Fighting in Pakistan on 27 May 2009,” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PShdOXwj2bo, accessed May 30, 2011. 
Maloney, Clarence. “Where did the Maldives People Come From?” International Institute 
for Asian Studies, http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/iiasn5/insouasi/maloney.html, accessed 
July 20, 2011. 
———. The People of the Maldive Islands. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1980. 
“Maumoon: Elections would decide whether Maldives would remain an Islamic 
Country,” Haveeru Daily, September 21, 2008, 
http://www.haveeru.com.mv/english/?page=details&id=24494, accessed March 3, 
2011. 
Moghadam, Assaf. The Globalization of Martyrdom. Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2008. 
Mohamed, Naseema. “The First Dhivehin,” Dhivehi Observer, 21 August 2006, 
http://www.dhivehiobserver.com/history/papers/First_Dhivehin_1708200612.htm
, accessed July 20, 2011. 
“More Skeletons Tumble out of the 26/11 Closet,” The Week, January 16, 2011. 
Nasheed, Mohamed. A Historical Overview of Traditional Dhivehi Polity, 1800 – 1900. 
Sri Lanka: Karunaratna & Sons, 2003. 
 NgCheong-Lum, Roseline. Cultures of the World: Maldives. New York: Marshall 
Cavendish Corp., 2000. 
Parmanand. “Winds of Change: Fresh Stirrings in the Maldives,” in Verinder Grover, Ed. 
Maldives: Government and Politics (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications Pvt. 
Ltd., 2000), 116–121. 
“Participants take Part in Salaf ‘Hijra’ Camp,” Minivan News, November 22, 2010. 
Phadnis Urmila and Luithui, Ela D. “The Maldives Enters World Politics,” Asian Affairs 
8, no. 3, 1981: .166–179. 
———. Maldives: Winds of Change in an Atoll State. New Delhi: South Asian 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1985. 
Phadnis, Urmila. “Maldives,” in Verinder Grover, ed. Maldives: Government and 
Politics. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication Pvt. Ltd., 2000: 105–113. 
Piscatori, James P. Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983. 
“President Forms a Committee to Control Gang Violence in Maldives,” Minivan News, 
March 29, 2011. 
 67
“Qayoom’s forces tortured and terrorized me says Sheikh Fareed,” Dhivehi Observer, 
December 21, 2006, http://www.dhivehiobserver.com/reports/Fareed-experience-
200920052.htm, accessed March 15, 2011.  
Rabasa, Angel M. et al., The Muslim World after 9/11. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2004. 
“Radicals in Pak recruiting our youth: Maldives.” Interview given by President Mohamed 
Nasheed of Maldives  to CNN-IBN, October 25, 2009. 
Ragupathy, Ponnampalam. The South Asian Heritage of Early Maldives. Male’, 
Maldives: Science Education Center, 1993. 
Raman, B. “Al-Qaeda in Maldives – International Terrorism Monitor – Paper No. 308,” 
South Asia Analysis Group, November 19, 2007. 
“Religious Extremism in L. Gan,” Haveeru Online Videos, October 26, 2007, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ah4OKVtYXNU&feature=related, accessed 
October 18, 2011. 
Report on 2008 Presidential Elections, Elections Commission of Maldives, November 27, 
2008. 
Richards, Alan. “Socio-economic Roots of Radicalism: Towards Explaining the Appeal 
of Islamic Radicals.” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph Series, US Army War 
College, 2003. 
Robinson, J. J. “Reported Increase in practice of Female Circumcision raises alarms,” 
Minivan News, October 30, 2011, http://minivannews.com/politics/reported-
increase-in-practice-of-female-circumcision-raises-alarm-27670, accessed 
November 8, 2011.  
Romero-Frias, Xavier. The Maldive Islanders: A Study of the Popular Culture of an 
Ancient Ocean Kingdom. Barcelona: Nova Ethnographica Indica, 1999. 
Roy, Oliver.  The Failure of Political Islam. Translated by Carol Volk. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994. 
Shauna, Aiminath. “MDP must prove it is not Christian, says DRP,” Minivan Daily, 
October 12, 2008.  
“State of Muslims,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUY90dma9ho, accessed 
November 18, 2011. 
Suryanarayan, V. “Islam, Political Evolution and National Identity in Vohra N. N. and 
Dixit, J. N. eds. Religion, Politics and Society in South and Southeast Asia. New 
Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998: 113–127. 
Swami, Praveen. “Uneasy in Paradise,” Frontline, 24, no. 24, December 2007, 8–21. 
“The Executive, Ch 3: 38: The Constitution of the Republic Maldives,” Attorney 
General’s Office, http://agoffice.gov.mv/pdf/ga/oldGA.pdf, accessed March 3, 
2011. 
“Two convicted Sultan Park Bombers Released,” Haveeru Daily, August 17, 2010. 
 68
United States Department of Defense. Office for the Administrative Review of the 
Detention of Enemy Combatants. Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal – Ibrahim Fauzee, December 13, 2004, 95. 
Upadhyay, R. “Islamic Radicalization of Maldives,” South Asia Analysis Group, (March 
7, 2008), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org//papers27/paper2610.html, accessed 
March 3, 2011.  
Wagoner, Phillip B. “Sultan Among Hindu Kings: Dress, Titles and Islamicization of 
Hindu Culture at Vijayanagar,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 55, no. 4, 1996: 
851–880. 
“World Almanac of Islamism: Maldives,” American Foreign Policy Council, 
http://almanac.afpc.org/maldives, accessed June 3, 2011. 
Young I. A. and Christopher, W. “Memoir on the Inhabitants of the Maldive Islands,” in 
Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society from 1836 to 1838, 54–86. 
 69
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Associate Professor Muhammed M. Hafez 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Assistant Professor Anshu Chatterjee 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Professor Daniel Moran 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
